Truth and Reconciliation: The Global Politics of Justice

Bethuel Kiplagat, Chair of Kenya’s Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission in 2010.

The BBC is reporting that a long-awaited report investigating violence and human rights abuses in Kenya will recommend some prosecutions of key officials for their roles. The Truth Reconciliation and Justice Commission was established in the aftermath of post-election violence that rocked Kenya following the 2008 presidential elections. However, its mandate was broader and included looking at past injustices from the Kenyan independence in December 1963 through the disputed February 2008 elections. According to the BBC’s coverage, Ahmed Sheikh Farah, who sat on the committee, indicated that “victims would be happy” with the recommendations but also warned that “we have been centered on reconciliation—healing, unity, that kind of focus.”

The report comes at an interesting time in Kenya’s political history. About six weeks ago, Uhuru Kenyatta won the presidency and was sworn into office. However, Kenyatta has been charged by the International Criminal Court with orchestrating some of the violence following the last presidential election. That violence resulted in more than 1,500 deaths and displaced more than 300,000 people from their homes.

Truth and reconciliation commissions are interesting instruments. They are generally charged with revealing wrongdoing rather than achieving justice per se. And they have been growing in popularity in recent

Archbishop Desmond Tutu presides over South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

years. One of the earliest was Argentina’s National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (the Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas, or CONADEP). CONADEP was established shortly after the collapse of Argentina’s military government in 1983, and was charged with investigating the fate of the estimated 30,000 persons who were “disappeared” by the Argentine government between 1976 and 1983. Perhaps the most famous was South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which was established in 1995 and was charged with witnessing and recording the crimes and human rights abuses committed by both state and opposition forces during the apartheid era. Other notable examples include Brazil’s Comissão Nacional da Verdade, which is currently investigating human rights abuses by the country’s former military government, and Canada’s Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which is currently investigating human rights abuses in the country’s residential school system for the Canada’s first nations.

Most truth and reconciliation commissions represent an effort to expand understanding rather that to achieve justice. They generally lack the power to prosecute offenders. Indeed, in many cases, like the South African TRC, individuals offering testimony before the commission were generally granted amnesty for any confessions they offered. The emphasis, in other words, is on promoting transparency and providing a historical record and testimony rather than on achieving justice in the traditional sense. But this also a source of controversy, as victims can sometimes feel as though the perpetrators of violence and human rights abuses can escape punishment.

What do you think? Do truth commissions represent an instrument of justice by witnessing and providing a historical record of human rights abuses? Or do they undermine justice by permitting human rights abusers to escape criminal prosecution? Leave a comment below and let us know what you think.

The Politics of UN Security Council Reform

President Barack Obama chairs a meeting of the UN Security Council, September 24, 2009.

Blogging at Foreign Policy, David Bosco yesterday posted an interesting proposal for reform of the United Nations Security Council. As most readers probably already know, the UN Security Council is comprised of 15 members. The five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) each possess a veto over Security Council action. In addition, ten non-permanent members are elected by a two-thirds majority vote of the General Assembly to two year terms on a regional basis.

The structure of the Security Council was set in the immediate aftermath of World War II, when the five permanent members made more sense. The structure makes little sense today, though. Several important countries (such as Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan) lack a permanent seat but want one. Meanwhile, the current permanent members of the Security Council are hesitant to embrace expansion, as any expansion would dilute their position.

And therein lies the challenge. Given the competing positions, there has been little agreement on how to move forward.  And any changes would require the approval of 2/3 of the Member States in the General Assembly and agreement by the five permanent members of the Security Council. Thus while a general consensus that the Security Council’s structure needs reforming is widely shared, the specifics of any individual country’s membership on the Council draws opposition. Italy and Spain oppose Germany’s claim, Mexico, Columbia, and Argentina oppose Brazil, Pakistan opposes India, South Korea opposes Japan. The African bloc also demands membership, though precisely which countries would represent Africa on the Council is not entirely clear. Given this level of disagreement, it has been relatively easy for the permanent members of the Council to avoid the difficult decisions associated with reform.

And this is what makes Bosco’s proposal so intriguing. He suggests that the General Assembly engage in a policy of collective disobedience, refusing to approve any new rotating members for the Security Council until the permanent members of the Security Council move forward with a real reform of the Council. It would also force the various camps in the General Assembly to set aside their competing positions and develop a coherent reform proposal. Bosco notes the collective action problem that would have to be overcome for this proposal to work. Nevertheless, it represents in interesting possibility in moving a twenty-year old debate forward.

What do you think? Should Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan be granted permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council? Can the United Nations overcome the structural challenges it faces and reform its structure to become more relevant in the 21^st century? Or will competing positions and the structural power of the permanent members undermine proposals for reform? Take the poll or leave a comment below and let us know what you think.

The BRICS Development Bank: The Future of South-South Cooperation?

Conclusion of the BRICS Summit in South Africa.

The BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) announced their intention to fund a new development bank to challenge what they perceive as the Western-dominated agenda of the international financial institutions (IFIs). The move, which came about two weeks ago, has generated considerable discussion both of the charges leveled by the BRICS against the IFIs and about the role of the BRICS in global politics more generally.

The BRICS’s new development bank would be funded through an initial donation from each of the five countries, though considerable debate over what precisely the new bank will do. And therein lies the fundamental problem. The idea of South-South cooperation, that is, the exchange of resources, knowledge, and technology between developing countries, has been popular since the 1970s. Its proponents argued that South-South cooperation could reduce developing countries dependence on the developed world and could lead to a shift in the international balance of power away from the first world. But little real progress has been made.

And that precisely is the issue. As the al Jazeera article announcing the BRICS development bank noted, “Disputes remain over what the new bank will do, with all sides trying to mould the institution to their own foreign or domestic policy goals, and with each looking for assurances of an equitable return on their initial investment.”

Collectively, the BRICS countries represent approximately for one-quarter of global economic activity and are home to about 40 percent of the world’s population. And yet their interests are often at odds, reflecting the diversity of their political and economic experiences. Blogging at Project Syndicate, political economist Dani Rodrick argues that, “just about the only thing these countries have in common is that they are the only economies ranked among world’s 15 largest that are not members of the OECD.” Rodrick notes that in the structures of their economies (Russia and Brazil depend on commodity exports, India on Services, and China on manufacturing), their political systems (Brazil and China are democracies, China and Russia are not), and on their global position (China is rising while Russia is a superpower in decline), the BRICS have little in common.

Further, apart from the development bank proposal (which still lacks any real details), the BRICS have failed to articulate a coherent global policy in any real sense. Rodrick argues that the  BRICS have played “a rather unimaginative and timid role” in global politics, while  Joseph Nye notes that the diversity (indeed, the rivalry) between the BRICS countries undermine their potential to work together to develop a coherent challenge to the existing global political and economic infrastructure.

What do you think? Does the BRICS bank represent a challenge to the international financial institutions? Can Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa present a new impetus for South-South cooperation? Or do the stark differences between the countries undermine the potential for effective cooperation? Take the poll or leave a comment below and let us know what you think.

The New International (Economic) Order

Leaders of Brazil, Russia, China, and India at the First BRIC Summit in Ekaterinburg, Russia.

Blogging at Foreign Policy, David Rothkopf recently raised some interesting questions with respect to the rise of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). The recent meeting of the BRIC countries (plus South Africa) in China did not develop any policies or organizations. But it did stand in stark contrast, he argues, to the NATO effort in Libya. While the BRICs were able to offer a (reasonably) coordinated position on Libya, NATO appears to be in disarray. In Rothkopf’s observation,

NATO is at a watershed. The Libya “moment,” which President Obama and others wanted to offer up as an example of a new robust, American-led multilateralism, is quickly morphing into a demonstration of NATO’s weaknesses. America wants to be accorded the respect of being the leader but is hamstrung by domestic problems and a lack of strategic clarity. France and Britain seem willing to pick up the slack but others won’t follow. Germany seems increasingly uncomfortable with the burdens placed on it as Europe’s de facto leading power. The military alliance is overly dependent on U.S. power. There are too many chefs. There is not enough overall mission clarity.

Meanwhile, even while the BRICS are a long, long way from being politically cohesive, they are rent with divisions over important issues, and they have zero aspirations to anything as formal or as action-oriented as an alliance, they do have a few things going for them that make them powerful…The Atlantic alliance may be where much of the money and power has been. The “BRICS Plus” represents not only the bulk of the world’s people and resources but also where the fastest growth is.

The G-20 is increasingly forced to recognize the important role of the BRICs. Brazil’s continuing defiance on the issue of currency controls provide but one example. And while the BRICs continue to be excluded from other key positions in the international community—most notably, with the exception of China, from permanent representation on the UN Security Council—they are nevertheless making their presence felt. The interesting question is how the BRICs will shape the international community moving forward. While suggestions that the United States and its western allies are in decline may be overstated, it does seem clear that the international community will increasingly need to accommodate a greater diversity of interests, represented in part by the BRICs, moving forward.

The Challenge of Dumping

Cotton Production

In international trade law, dumping is defined as selling goods below the cost of production plus transportation and handling. Under World Trade Organization rules, dumping is illegal. But countries continue to engage in the process, as demonstrated by the large number of cases involving accusations of dumping heard by the WTO’s dispute resolution panels.

Perhaps the most high-profile dispute in recent years has been the dispute between Brazil and the United States over U.S. cotton subsidies. Brazil contends (and the WTO panels have upheld twice, first in 2005 and again in 2008) that U.S. cotton subsidies are illegal under WTO rules because the sale of such subsidized cotton represents dumping. The cotton dispute is one of the key sticking points in current Doha Round of WTO talks, as a number of developing countries, including Brazil, have demanded the elimination of U.S. cotton subsidies which depress global cotton prices. According to a report prepared by the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, global cotton prices would be 6 percent higher absent U.S. subsidies. This represents a significant increase in the livelihoods of poor cotton producers in the global south.

A new study, prepared by Timothy Wise for Woodrow Wilson Center, analyzes the impact of agricultural dumping on Mexican farmers under NAFTA.  Looking at agricultural production and trade from 1997 to 2005,Wise concludes that Mexican producers suffered across a number of agricultural sectors, losing some $1.4 billion per year over the course of the study. According to Wise, this represents more than 10 percent of the value of all Mexican agricultural exports to the United States.  Maize production was particularly hard hit, as maize imports from the United States were priced, on average, 19 percent below production costs, leading to a 66 percent decline in real producer prices for maize during the time under study.  Wise concludes that

Mexico certainly serves as a warning to developing countries considering agricultural trade liberalization. The case also highlights the weakness of international rules for defining and disciplining agricultural dumping. That weakness, and the vulnerability of developing-country farmers to import surges, makes all the more reasonable developing-country demands in the stalled Doha Round negotiations for strong Special Product measures to protect key food crops and effective Special Safeguard Measures to protect against import surges. Until agricultural dumping can be disciplined effectively, developing countries must retain the policy space to defend themselves. Mexico gave up most of its defenses under NAFTA. Farmers are paying a high price.

Dumping—or more generally agricultural subsidies and trade—represents one of the key barriers to the conclusion of the Doha Round of international trade talks. Intended to address some of the major imbalances in international trade, the Doha Round was intended to be the first round of international trade talks focused squarely on international development. But differences between the developed world, led primarily by the European Union, the United Sates, and Japan, and the developing world, led by China, Brazil, India, and South Africa, have paralyzed talks since 2008, and the prospect of rekindling talks appears dim. The major outstanding issues remain:

• Agriculture, especially agricultural subsidies and dumping: Massive subsidies by the United States, Japan and the European Union continue to depress global agricultural prices, undermining production in the global south.
• Access to essential medicines: Establishing conditions under which developing countries can reconcile meting public health needs with the strong system of intellectual property protections afforded under World Trade Organization rules.
• Special and Differential Treatment: Determining if developing countries will be afforded different treatment under some WTO rules.

Wise’s full report, Agricultural Dumping Under NAFTA is available online.

The Global Financial Crisis, Revisited

Blogging at Triple Crisis, Kevin Gallagher noted an interesting development in the “blame game” between the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the United Nations, and the World Trade Organization regarding the causes of the global financial crisis last year. As Gallagher notes, the World Trade Organization held its much anticipated session on the WTO and the financial crisis last week, claiming that the WTO played no negative role in the crisis.

The debate centers on the role of financial controls and capital account liberalization in the broader liberalization process. While the International Monetary Fund increasingly recognizes the importance of capital controls in preventing financial crises, the World Trade Organization continues to maintain that the imposition of capital controls may be “actionable” under the General Agreement on Trade in Services. In other words, even as the IMF acknowledges that imposing limits on the ability of speculative investors to move in and out of particular economies may provide an avenue for governments to limit the negative impact of such speculative investment on their national economies, the World Trade Organization’s rules make such restrictions a punishable offense.

The recognition of the importance of capital controls is not new. Joseph Stiglitz made a similar argument following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, arguing that the IMF ignored the importance of sequencing liberalization to avoid economic crises in developing economies. But there are two important take-away points here. First, the fact that the IMF—the former bastion of unrestricted liberalization—now recognizes that liberalization must be paced represents an important development in the international economy. Indeed, as a February 2010 IMF Staff Paper noted, controls on capital inflows “can usefully form part of the policy toolkit to address the economic or financial concerns surrounding sudden surges in capital.” Second, as Gallagher argues in his paper on the topic, capital account liberalization is not associated with economic growth in developing countries. In other words, at least among developing economies, there is little benefit but much risk in liberalizing financial flows. This is something that the government of Brazil recognized early in the global financial crisis, when it imposed a two percent tax on capital inflows attempting to limit portfolio investment tin the county.

Five Stories You Might Have Missed

Debates over Wall Street compensation reemerged on the national stage last week, as the government urged companies that received federal assistance under the Troubled Asset Recovery Program (TARP) limit executive compensation. On Thursday, the Federal Reserve issued draft rules governing compensation for companies that have not repaid TARP assistance. Under the new rules, the companies would be required to demonstrate that their compensation packages do not encourage excessive risk-taking. In an interview with the Financial Times, George Soros weighed in on the debate, calling Wall Street’s profits this quarter “hidden gifts” from the U.S. government. He commented that, “Those earning are not from the achievement of risk-takers. These are gifts, hidden gifts, so I don’t think that those monies should be used to pay bonuses. There’s a resentment which I think is justified.”

Meanwhile, concerns over the spread of the H1N1 (swine flu) virus continue to grow. On Saturday, President Barack Obama declared a declaration of “national emergency” to combat the flu. Under the declaration, hospitals eases some restrictions on hospital operations, giving them additional powers to treat the flu. 

In news from outside the United States last week:

1. German Chancellor Angela Merkel formally announced her new coalition agreement on Saturday. There were few surprises, as Merkel’s center right Christian Democrats allied with the liberal Free Democratic Party. The coalition contract included a promise to pass a €24 billion tax cut for poor and middle-income Germans and will reform inheritance laws. Under the new coalition agreement, Guido Westerwelle, the leader of the Free Democrats, will assume the post of foreign minister. The Christian Democrat’s Wolfgang Schäuble, a strong fiscal conservative, will become finance minister.

2. In two separate attacks, two car bombs exploded outside government buildings in Baghdad, Iraq, on Sunday, killed more than 130 people and injuring more than 500. The attacks were the deadliest in more than two months. Iraq had been enjoying a period of relative stability, as Western-backed tribal leaders had pushed al Qaeda militants into the margins. But U.S. officials contend that Iraq may be entering a period of increased violence, as militants attempt to reignite sectarian violence ahead of parliamentary elections scheduled for next year.

3. Negotiations intended to resolve the standoff over the Iranian nuclear program appear to have stalled. The talks, which were reopened early last week, were intended to develop an agreement which reduced Iran’s stockpile of low enriched uranium (LEU), building upon an agreement reached earlier this month under which Iran agreed, in principle, to send some of its estimated 1,200 kg of LEU to Russia and France, which would convert the fuel into medical isotopes before sending it back to Iran. But after Iran failed to meet a Friday deadline, the United States warned that it would be willing to wait for a few more days, but cautioned that its patience was limited. Iran’s current stockpile, if enriched, could provide enough uranium for a single nuclear weapon.

4. Figthing between Somali insurgents and African Union (AU) peacekeepers broke out in Mogadishu on Thursday, killing at least 30 people. According to witnesses, militants attacked using mortars as Somali President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed was leaving the country for a meeting in Uganda. AU forces responded with artillery fire. More than 19,000 civilians have been killed, and an estimated 1.5 million people have been displaced from their homes since 2007 as a result of ongoing fighting in Somalia, which has made the country a center for international piracy and terrorism.

5. The government of Brazil on Tuesday imposed a two percent tax on some capital inflows into the country. The decision, which as intended to slow the increase in the value of the real, Brazil’s currency, which had already increased more than 36 percent against the U.S. dollar this year. The new tax targets portfolio investment and financial speculation, not productive investment in the country. Nevertheless, the announcement was not well received by the market, and stocks fell sharply after the government made its announcement. But analysts offered a more positive pronouncement. In an editorial comment, the Financial Times described the new tax as “wise,” “sensible,” and “honest.”

Five Stories You Might Have Missed

The G20 meeting in Pittsburg this week resulted in agreement on several important principles, with the group agreeing in principle to establish guidelines for bankers’ pay, developing a timetable for reforming financial regulations, and establishing a new framework for economic growth. The G20 also agreed to transfer five percent of the shares in the International Monetary Fund and three percent of the shares in the World Bank to emerging countries. The organizations have long been criticized for voting structures which over-represent the developed world at the expense of the developing world.

In other news from the previous week:

1. There were several important developments in Iran this week. On Sunday, Iran test fired a short-range missile as part of ongoing war games in the country. The missile, a Shahab-3, has range sufficient to reach Israel and U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf. The launch comes just days after the United States announced it had discovered Iran possessed a second, secret uranium enrichment facility. France and the United Kingdom joined the United States in condemning Iran for misleading the international community. The discovery and announcement put pressure on Tehran, which maintains that the facility is used for peaceful purposes. The most recent announcement produced new signals from Russia, which had historically opposed sanctions against Iran. But after being briefed on the new facilities by the Obama administration, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev indicated that the Russian government may be willing to consider sanctions as a way of addressing the Iranian nuclear situation.

2. Germany is headed to the polls today, with most analysts calling the election too close to call and many speculating about what kind of coalition will take control of the world’s fourth largest economy. Although Angela Merkel’s ruling Christian Democrats have been leading throughout the campaign, her support has been slipping over the past week. With low turnout forecast, observers believe that the election could still be close. Further, a quirk in the German voting system could result in Merkel’s CDU winning a plurality of seats in the Bundestag despite winning a smaller percentage of the popular vote than her rivals. Her rival, the Social Democrats, have lagged in the polls throughout the campaign but managed a late-campaign surge. No matter what the margins, negotiations around a forming a new coalition in Germany will likely be the central focus of German politics in coming days.

3. Two car bombings believed to the work of the Taliban in Pakistan killed 27 people on Saturday. The attacks targeted Pakistan’s military and police forces, coming just days after the country’s President, Asif Ali Zardari, appealed to the G20 for assistance in fighting terrorism in Pakistan. The attacks demonstrate the resilience of the Taliban in Pakistan, which has been engaged in a protracted war with the national military. Last month, the Pakistani military killed Baitullah Mehsud, the Taliban’s main leader in Pakistan, and earlier this year, the military killed more than 3,000 Taliban militants in operations in the Swat valley region. Despite these losses, however, the Taliban remains a central threat to the stability of the Pakistani regime. 

4. The government of Guinea is moving forward with its efforts to overturn some of the contracts signed with foreign companies under the military dictatorship of Lansana Conté, whose 24 year-rule ended with his death in December. The new government has already forced Rio Tinto to return a portion of its iron ore concessions and convinced the South African gold company, AngloGold Ashanti, to establish a $10 million fund to pay for environmental damages caused by their operations in the country. On Tuesday, the government ordered the Russian aluminum company Rusal to quit the country, claiming that it owed more than$750 million in taxes, royalties, and other duties owed since 2002. With a GDP per capita of $442, Guinea remains one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world.

5. Deposed President Manuel Zelaya returned to Honduras last week, sneaking into the country and hiding in the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa. Honduran security forces used water cannons and tear gas to dispurse crowds which had gathered outside the embassy in support of Zelaya. The Brazilian government has called on the international community to do more to support Zelaya’s return. Most of the international community has refused to recognize the new government and international assistance from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund has been suspended. Speaking before the United Nations General Assembly on Wednesday, Brazlian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva said, “The international community demands that Mr Zelaya return immediately to the presidency of his country and must be alert to ensure the inviolability of Brazil’s diplomatic mission in the capital of Honduras.”

Of Cotton Subsidies and Essential Medicines

On Monday, the World Trade Organization [glossary] granted partial approval to Brazil’s proposal to impose countervailing sanctions against U.S. goods after the United States failed to comply with an earlier order to end illegal subsidies to cotton farmers. The ruling is the latest development in a trade dispute that stenches back several years. In 2002, Brazil failed suit against the United States, claiming that U.S. subsidies [glossary] to cotton farmers violated WTO rules and cost Brazil more than $3 billion per year in revenue lost due to distorted global prices. Brazil won its case in 2004, but the U.S. Congress has been slow to remove the subsidies.

Under WTO rules, Brazil would has the right to impose countervailing tariffs against U.S. exports to Brazil, up to the amount that the WTO certified Brazil is losing due to U.S. policy, in this case $3 billion. But for countries in the developing world, such an option is often unpalatable for two reasons. First, the imposition of tariffs could lead to higher consumer prices for goods, which can be politically unpopular. Second, the relative size of the markets means that Brazil’s loss of access to U.S. markets has a greater impact than the U.S.’s loss of access to Brazilian markets, even if the two losses are equal in absolute terms. Consequently, developing countries have made significantly less use of the WTO’s dispute resolution system and, even when victorious, have been more hesitant to use countervailing tariffs to enforce WTO decisions.

But Brazil’s proposal was an interesting one. After the United States continued to refuse to remove the trade distorting subsidies, it appealed to the WTO for an alternative recourse. Brazil proposed to impose the WTO penalty not by imposing tariffs on U.S. goods exported to Brazil, but by infringing patents on U.S. pharmaceutical products.

Brazil’s proposal is interesting in three respects. First, it makes the WTO’s dispute resolution system much more accessible to the countries of the global south. Enforcement, which has historically been difficult for countries in the global south, would be become more feasible. Second, it hits the United States in an area of much greater significance. The United States has long pushed for stronger intellectual property protections worldwide, campaigning against expanding the World Health Organization’s essential medicines list, for example. The political value of a ruling against U.S. pharmaceutical interests would be much higher as a result. Finally, and most importantly, such a ruling would link the agricultural subsidies dispute—which has been at the center of WTO talks in recent years—directly to the health and medicines debate. Farmers in the global south, whose lose an estimated $300 billion per year as a result of agricultural subsidies in the global north, could potentially benefit as a result of access to cheaper generic medicines manufactured in the global south.

So, on Monday, the WTO ruled. It denied Brazil’s request to bypass intellectual property protections, but confirmed that such a request could, in principle, be granted in the future. Indeed, last year, the WTO granted Antigua the right to do precisely that in its trade dispute over U.S. gambling laws. In the Brazilian case, the WTO decided that the current level of subsidies is not high enough to warrant such a radical step. A small victory for both sides, perhaps, but certainly a warning to the United States that intellectual property rights may be an effective tool to influence U.S. trade policy.

Five Stories You Might Have Missed

Japanese elections took place on Sunday, marking a dramatic shift in political power in the country. The Liberal Democratic Party, which has ruled Japan for nearly all of its post-World War II history, looks set to lose handily to its main rival, the Democratic Party of Japan. Some analysists are projecting the DPJ may win as many as 320 seats in the lower house, giving it a two-thirds majority and eliminating any need to form coalition partners. Prime Minister nad LDP leader Taro Aso has already conceded defeat and announced his intention to resign as party leader. With the DPJ’s victory, Yukio Hatoyama looks poised to become the country’s next prime minister.

In other news from the previous week:

1. The dispute over the status of last week’s Afghan election continues. Although incumbent President Hamid Karzai has extended his lead in the most recent results, the current tally (in which Karzai leads his main challenger, Abdullah Abdullah 46% to 31%) would still force a runoff election in October. Although final results are not expected until the end of September, Abdullah has accused the government of engaging in a “massive state-engineer[ing]” of the election results, alleging voter intimidation, ballot-box stuffing, and other election irregularities. The United States has also expressed concerns over the accusations, with U.S. Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan “mak[ing] it very clear” in a meeting with Karzai last week that the election should be free and fair.

2.  Fighting between the government of Burma and a rebel militia known as the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army broke out last week, ending a ceasefire signed between the two more than twenty years ago. The fighting, which has led to a massive exodus of refugees into China, drew criticism from the Chinese government over the weekend. China has been one of the few countries to maintain close ties to the Burmese government, but those ties have been challenged after a reported 10,000-30,000 people crossed into China to flee fighting. The Burmese government is attempting to reassert control ahead of next year’s elections over a region which has large ethnic minorities who reject the central government’s authority.

3. The United Arab Emirates announced it had seized a ship carrying North Korean arms to Iran. According to a report issued by the government of the UAE to the United Nations, the ship, which was seized several weeks ago, was carrying ammunition and small arms, including rocket-propelled grenades, in contravention of a UN embargo established under UN Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009). That resolution was passed after North Korea’s second nuclear test in May. The United Arab Emirates is a close U.S. ally in the region, and has been under pressure to step-up its screening of  shipments bound for Iran.

4. The longstanding trade dispute between Brazil and the United States will take a new turn on Monday, when the World Trade Organization is expected to rule that Brazil may infringe patents on U.S. pharmaceuticals in retaliation for U.S. subsidies on cotton. Brazil successfully challenged U.S. cotton subsides in 2002, when the WTO ruled that the $3 billion annual cotton subsidies paid by the U.S. government unfairly distorted global cotton prices. Despite the victory, the United States has continued to pay the subsidies, and the Brazilian government has struggled to find a way to enforce the ruling. If the WTO does indeed rule that Brazil may bypass U.S. intellectual property protection in the case, it may represent a new avenue for developing countries to enforce WTO rulings. More on this in a future blog entry.

5. South African President Jacob Zuma stated last week that he will be quick to condemn any “deviant” behavior during his upcoming visit to Zimbabwe. The South African government has historically been very slow to criticize the Zimbabwean government or to bring pressure on the country, which has been in the throes of an economic and political crisis for the more than five years. Meanwhile, a United Nations report last week contended that international humanitarian assistance for Zimbabwe has fallen well short of the amount needed to address the food shortages and disease outbreaks facing the country. The UN estimates Zimbabwe will require $718 million in humanitarian aid this year. So far, only $316 million has been pledged.