North Korea’s Nuclear Test

South Korean Television covers the North Korean Nuclear Test

On Monday North Korea tested a nuclear device, prompting sharp criticism from the Obama administration and provoking renewed discussions of expanded sanctions in the United Nations Security Council. The Central Intelligence Agency reported that Monday’s test was more powerful than previous nuclear tests conducted by the North Korean government in 2006 and 2009.

The test, conducted in direct violation of UN Security Council resolutions, led North Korea’s closest ally, the People’s Republic of China, to summon the North Korean ambassador in protest. The North Korean government defended its action as an act of self-defense necessitated by “U.S. hostility,” and promised to continue its efforts if necessary. According to the United States and its allies, North Korea is operating in violation of its obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT.

What does the NPT actually do? The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty spells out the obligations of signatory states under three separate areas. First, non-nuclear weapons states agree not to pursue the development or deployment of nuclear weapons. Second, recognized nuclear weapons states (under the NPT, these are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, who coincidently are also the five permanent members of the UN Security Council) agree to undertake efforts towards total nuclear disarmament. Finally, the right of all states to the peaceful use of nuclear power is guaranteed.  However, there are several nuclear weapons states which are not party to the treaty. India, Israel, and Pakistan—all of which are believed to possess nuclear weapons—are non-signatories and thus fall outside the obligations of the treaty. North Korea was a signatory but formally withdrew from the agreement in 2003. Iran remains a signatory to the treaty but is believed to be developing nuclear weapons in violation of its treaty obligations. South Africa developed nuclear weapons in the 1980s but decommissioned its nuclear stockpiles in the early 1990s, making it the only state ever to voluntarily decommission an existing nuclear weapons capability.

So is North Korea in violation of its obligations? The answer depends on who you ask. The United States’ position (generally supported by the international community) is that North Korea’s nuclear program violations its international obligations. North Korea, however, regularly asserts that it withdrew from the NPT and can therefore pursue a nuclear program in its self-defense.

This, of course, raises the broader question about the effectiveness of nuclear weapons as a deterrence. The doctrine of mutually assured destruction, popularized during the Cold War, suggests that the threat of total destruction associated with the use of nuclear weapons by two nuclear weapons powers renders the use of those weapons unfeasible, as no winning strategy could result. The use of nuclear weapons is essentially self-defeating. But the threat posed by possessing nuclear weapons—indeed, the prestige of nuclear weapons—is a powerful motivator for states to pursue such weapons, often even in the face of high social and political costs, as the cases of Iran and North Korea attest.

What do you think? Does North Korea’s nuclear program present a threat to the United States? Is North Korean nuclear policy best explained as a rational pursuit of the national interest? And how does international law help us understand the debate surrounding the North Korean nuclear program? Take the poll or leave a comment and let us know what you think.

Iran’s Ongoing Nuclear Ambitions

Satellite image of Iran’s Fordow nuclear enrichment facility.

The International Atomic Energy Agency on Friday warned that the Iranian government continues to make progress in its effort to boost uranium production and refinement in the country. It noted that Iran has, in the past three months, completed installing new centrifuges in a secret nuclear facility and has refused to provide the IAEA with opportunity to monitor its activities. The IAEA also believes that Iran is trying to destroy evidence of previous nuclear enrichment activities ahead of scheduled IAEA inspections.

International efforts to monitor and prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons materials have to-date focused on several resolutions of the UN Security Council, and on international negations between the United States, China, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany (the so-called P5+1 group) and Iran.

Against the international backdrop, the Israeli government continues to threaten unilateral action against Iran to prevent it from developing a nuclear weapon, raising the stakes for all parties involved.

The primary challenge, though, is that there appear to be few good options in dealing with Iran. Economic sanctions are already in place and are having a devastating effect on the Iranian economy. There was a glimmer that the sanctions may force the Iranian government back to the negotiating table, but it is not clear whether or not that would happen before Iran developed a nuclear capacity, fundamentally altering the nature of international negotiations.

Covert efforts, including the deployment of computer viruses targeting Iranian nuclear facilities, have appeared to slowed Iran’s progress but have not stopped it altogether.

And a military strike against Iran could create broader challenges in the region, undermining support for US efforts in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and creating uncertainty in global oil markets, threatening the global economic recovery.

What do you think? What is the best option to deal with Iran’s nuclear ambitions? Should the United States continue to support international efforts at a negotiated settlement? Should it support Israeli proposals for a military strike despite the economic threat posed by such an option? Take the poll below or leave a comment and let us know your thoughts.

Multilateral Diplomacy and Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions

Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Egypt’s Mohamed Morsi greet each other at Non-Aligned Movement summit.

On Friday, the Nonaligned Movement handed Iran a significant foreign policy victory, unanimously declaring their support for Iran’s civilian nuclear energy program and condemning American efforts to push Iran to end its initiative.

The Nonaligned Movement was founded in the 1960s when many of the most influential leaders from recently decolonized countries and neutral countries from around the world, including Yugoslavia’s Josip Tito, Indonesia’s President Sukarno, Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, and India’s Jawaharlal Nehru, came together to articulate a middle course between American and Soviet-alignment during the Cold War. Later, in the late 1970s, the group declared that its role was to ensure “the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of non-aligned countries” in their “struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, interference or hegemony as well as against great power and bloc politics.”

After the end of the Cold War, the Nonaligned Movement struggled to redefine its mission. But with 120 members, the Nonaligned Movement is one of the largest associations of states outside of the United Nations. Its declaration thus likely complicates US efforts to paint Iran as a rogue nation flouting international norms and defying the will of the international community. It could be an important diplomatic victory for the government of Iran.

On a broader level, the Nonaligned Movement’s declaration also raises interesting questions about the importance of multilateral diplomacy in foreign policy. Traditionally, realists have asserted that the “will of the international community” carries little weight. For realists, the Nonaligned Movement’s declaration will have little real effect, as few of its member states are likely to take concrete steps to support Iran. What really matters is the willingness of individual states to act on their interests. If the United States (or more likely, Israel) believes that Iran’s nuclear program poses a threat to their national interest, they will move to address that threat regardless of the will of the international community.

For liberals, though, the Nonaligned Movement’s declaration presents more of a challenge. From this perspective, the will of the international community matters and should be taken seriously. The unanimous declaration would suggest that the United States and Israel are alone, out on a limb, with respect to their Iran policy. At a minimum, the United States would need to recalculate its position in an effort to garner greater international support for sanctions and other efforts to prevent Iran from securing nuclear weapons.

However, the constructivist position offers perhaps the most interesting take on recent developments in Iran. For constructivists, the Nonaligned Movement’s declaration has the potential to reframe the discussion on Iran, shifting the discourse from a focus on the development of nuclear weapons to civilian use of nuclear energy. Such a reframing would likely make the US position more difficult.

What do you think, does the Nonaligned Movement change US options with respect to Iran’s nuclear program? Do multilateral organizations like the Nonaligned Movement matter? Or are the realists right that only the national interest and the willingness of states to commit resources in pursuit of that interest matter?

The Intersection of Domestic Politics and Foreign Affairs

Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney addresses reporters in Israel.

Israel was in the news this week, as both Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta met with key Israeli leaders to discuss, among other things, the Iranian nuclear program.

During his meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu last week, Mitt Romney was unreserved in his position, asserting that ensuring the security of Israel and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capability “must be our highest national security priority.” Romney’s senior national security aid, Dan Senor, clarified Romeny’s statement, concluding that, “If Israel has to take action on its own, in order to stop Iran from developing that capability, the governor would respect that decision.”

With his statements, Romney was trying to draw a sharp contrast between his position and the position of the Obama administration. Just two days after Romney’s meeting with Netanyahu, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta was expressing a more reserved tone. In his meeting yesterday with Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, he urged Israel to show restraint in its dealings with Iran.

The New York Times reported that there are growing concerns in the Obama administration that Israel may be preparing for a unilateral military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities as early as this fall. Secretary Panetta’s visit was just the most recent in a series of flurry of trips to Israel by high ranking administration officials in recent weeks . Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon each recently visited Israel as well.

These visits occurred amid increasing rhetorical attacks by the Israeli government. On Wednesday, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu stated that discussion of sanctions against Iran were useless. Netanyahu concluded that, “Right now, the Iranian government believes that the international community does not have the will to stop its nuclear program. This must change and it must change quickly because time to resolve this issue peacefully is running out.”

The Israeli calculation is highly influenced by the timing of the US presidential elections. Most observers believe that if an Israeli strike were to occur, it would likely be in September or early October. As the New York Times observed, “Mr. Netanyahu feels that he will have less leverage if President Obama is re-elected, and that if Mr. Romney were to win, the new president would be unlikely to want to take on a big military action early in his term.”
Perhaps the largest problem facing the international community the lack of viable options. Ongoing negotiations with Iran have failed to produce the desired outcome. Sanctions have not been historically effective in promoting policy changes, as the longstanding US embargos against Cuba and North Korea attest. And an Israeli strike against Iran would likely produce a strong response from the Iranian government, perhaps including Iranian missile strikes against Tel Aviv. In such a scenario, the United States could well be pulled into another war in the Middle East.

What do you think? How should the United States deal with Israel and Iran? Can sanctions be effective? And how do the domestic politics of the United States affect the ongoing developments in the Middle East?

21st Century Warfare and Just War Theory

The use of cyberwarfare and predator drones (above) raise questions about the ethics of war in the 21st century.

Recent leaks of classified information on drone strikes, cyberwarfare, and terror plots have prompted U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder to appoint two prosecutors to investigate these leaks.  Much of the secret information has appeared in a series of New York Times articles dealing with the president’s national security decision-making.  While the leaks themselves are an important story, the content of the classified information paints a picture of a president and his advisers grappling with questions of ethics in an age of unconventional warfare.

Just War Theory refers to a body of thought developed over centuries by philosophers, theologians, and other scholars.  It seeks to define conditions under which war is just, or ethically defensible.  There is wide agreement on principles such as discrimination (the need to distinguish between combatants and civilians–one can target the former but should avoid attacking the latter).  But applying this principle in a war zone can become very difficult.  What if you are fighting against insurgents who don’t wear uniforms and use the civilian population as cover?  And what if the enemy puts a tank (a legitimate military target) next to a hospital or school?  Can the tank be attacked with an airstrike?

Advances in technology (e.g., nuclear weapons in the 20th century and cyberweapons/drones in the 21st century) can further complicate the application of Just War Theory to real-world cases.  Recent leaks describe President Obama personally ordering drone strikes against targets on a “kill list” and also ordering cyberwarfare to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program.  But they also show a president grappling with the ethical issues raised by such technology.  One New York Times article claims that the principle of discrimination plays a key role in decision-making on cyberwarfare:

“…Precisely because the United States refuses to talk about its new cyberarsenal, there has never been a real debate in the United States about when and how to use cyberweapons.  President Obama raised many of the issues in the closed sanctum of the Situation Room, participants in the conversation say, pressing aides to make sure that the attacks were narrowly focused so that they did not take out Iranian hospitals or power plants and were directed only at the country’s nuclear infrastructure. ‘He was enormously focused on avoiding collateral damage,’ one official said, comparing the arguments over using cyberwar to the debates about when to use drones.”

What do you think?  Has the U.S. been sufficiently careful to avoid civilian casualties in its use of drones and other weapons in Iraq, Aghanistan, and elsewhere?  Are some civilian casualties unavoidable and thus acceptable in warfare?  What are the limits of discrimination as a requirement for a just war?

Sunnis, Shiites, and the Arab Spring

Was Osama bin Laden a Sunni or Shiite Muslim? Can you identify the ruling sect in Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria?

Today’s Formula 1 race in Bahrain occurred without incident, but many observers had feared violence would mar the festivities.  This is because Bahrain, like several other countries in the region, is experiencing ongoing unrest pitting anti-government protesters against the ruling authorities.  And, as in other Middle Eastern countries, this clash has broken down along sectarian lines, with Sunni Muslims and Shiite Muslims vying for power.

While some Western commentators speak broadly of the “Arab and Muslim world,” painting with such broad strokes obscures many of the differences that help to make sense of the politics of today’s Middle East.  A few examples:

* In Iraq, the Sunni minority (which was in power under Saddam Hussein) is now facing a resurgent Shiite majority which controls the parliament and much of the executive branch. This struggle involves political competition and violence, although one commentator argues much of the violence is really about jihadism rather than sectarianism.

* Like in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Bahrain’s minority Sunnis enjoy power over the majority Shiites.  Sunnis have now mobilized to protect the regime and crack down on protesting Shiites.

* Saudi Arabia, a leading Sunni power, has intervened in Bahrain, Egypt, and Syria with military, economic, or political tools to help support the rise of Sunni actors and the defeat of Shiite forces.

* Iran, the region’s leading Shiite power, has close ties with Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Syria’s ruling Alawite sect.  The Alawites split off from Shia Islam over 1,000 years ago and consider Iran an ally in maintaining power against Syria’s restive Sunni majority.

Despite the importance of the Sunni-Shiite distinction in understanding today’s Middle East, many American policymakers (even some counter-terrorism officials) have displayed their ignorance on this point.  See this Op-Ed piece from Congressional Quarterly national security editor Jeff Stein for examples drawn from Stein’s interviews with U.S. officials.

It’s easy to scoff at these answers, but can you do any better?  Take this quiz on the differences between Sunni and Shiite Islam and see how well you do.

Poll: Is Iran Seeking a Nuclear Weapon?

Iran’s nuclear program is back in the news after negotiations between Iran and a group of six world powers resulted in an agreement to continue nuclear talks next month.  Iran claims its nuclear program is solely for peaceful energy generation purposes.  Many Western countries, including the United States, doubt this claim and believe the Iranian government is pursuing nuclear weapons capability.  Take the poll below and tell us what you think.

Election “Management” in Autocratic States

Former vice president and intelligence chief Omar Suleiman was one of ten Egyptian presidential candidates disqualified yesterday by Egypt's election commission.

Democracies aren’t the only states that hold elections. Autocratic states frequently hold elections also. But these elections fall far short of the “free and fair” standard in order to ensure outcomes acceptable to the regime. Common–and effective–tactics include putting only one name on the ballot (e.g., Saddam Hussein in 2002), intimidating voters, and having regime allies count the votes.

Another creative “election management” tactic has been used for years in Iran and appears to have been employed just yesterday by Egypt.  This measure preserves the appearance of a competitive election but disqualifies in advance any candidates the ruling authorities deem unacceptable.  In Egypt the High Election Commission eliminated 10 candidates for the upcoming presidential elections, including the three leading candidates: former vice president and intelligence chief Omar Suleiman, leading Muslim Brotherhood strategist Khairat el-Shater, and ultraconservative Islamist Hazem Salah Abu Ismail.  They were all disqualified for technical violations but the underlying reason may have been a desire to avoid deep societal conflict: ”The race has shaped up as a battle between Islamists and former officials of the Mubarak government. If the decision stands, it will effectively leave out the most polarizing candidates on both sides of the field.”  It is worth noting that Egypt is a regime in transition, so its interim rulers may be employing this tactic less to preserve their own power than to ensure a transition to the type of regime they ultimately want to see.

There is less ambiguity about the way this tactic is used in Iran.  An outstanding BBC guide entitled “How Iran is Ruled” describes the role of the highly influential Guardian Council in screening candidates (and legislation):

“The council has to approve all bills passed by parliament and has the power to veto them if it considers them inconsistent with the constitution and Islamic law. The council can also bar candidates from standing in elections to parliament, the presidency and the Assembly of Experts.  Reformist attempts to reduce the council’s vetting powers have proved unsuccessful and the council banned all but six of more than 1,000 hopefuls in the 2005 elections.  Two more, both reformists, were permitted to stand after the Supreme Leader intervened. All the female candidates were blocked from standing.”

Iran’s Guardian Council similarly disqualified 2,000 candidates prior to the 2008 parliamentary elections (most of them reformers).  The same pattern repeated itself for the 2012 elections.

While this candidate screening tactic is employed most egregiously and openly in autocratic states, does something similar happen in democracies?  In what ways are the candidates for high office in democracies recruited or “vetted” by powerful elites outside of public view?  Is this qualitatively different from what happens in autocracies, or is it essentially the same tactic?  What are the implications for democracy?

Poll: Can the World Tolerate a Nuclear Iran?

President Obama recently reiterated his pledge not to allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. But would a nuclear Iran really be an intolerable threat? Take the poll below and tell us your thoughts. (You can use the comment feature to explain your answer).

Follow-Up: Confronting Iran in an Election Year

Is Israel more likely to strike Iran because of the election campaign in America?

An interesting follow-up to a previous blog post on how domestic politics and world politics are intertwined:

In a January 8 post, I quoted Michael Cohen in Foreign Policy arguing that the 2012 U.S. presidential campaign and its associated rhetoric may constrain not only the Republican candidates’ future foreign policies (if elected) but President Obama’s current options:

“Moreover, all the tough talk on Iran will also limit Obama’s ability to open negotiations with Tehran over its nuclear program if the opportunity presents itself. Considering the increasingly desperate economic and political situation there, this might not necessarily be so far-fetched.”

An insightful news analysis in the New York Times this weekend entitled “Confronting Iran in a Year of Elections” extends these arguments further and provides a scenario in which the Obama administration will be pulled into a war against its will due to an ally’s (Israel’s) manipulation of American domestic political dynamics:

“[Israeli Prime Minister] Netanyahu’s government may calculate that if Israel is going to attempt a strike, doing so during the presidential campaign, when it would have the sympathy of many American voters, is the only way to avoid a major backlash from Mr. Obama, with whom Mr. Netanyahu has a tense relationship. Elliott Abrams, President George W. Bush’s hawkish Middle East adviser, wrote recently that if Israel attacked “Mr. Obama would be forced to back it and help Israel cope with the consequences. It might even help the president get re-elected if he ends up using force to keep the Strait of Hormuz open and Israel safe.””

In other words, an American president during a re-election campaign cannot afford to publicly break with an ally who has strong support among key segments of the American electorate and powerful friends in Washington, and this reality could embolden that ally to take risky actions and assume unconditional U.S. support.  Furthermore, this scenario only scratches the surface of the myriad links between electoral politics and foreign policy.  For example, foreign adversaries may avoid confrontations with any president who is running for re-election and is under criticism by domestic opponents for being “soft” on foreign threats.  Such a leader is under pressure to demonstrate his hardline credentials, and foreign adversaries would do well to avoid giving him an opportunity to do so.

Do you think Israel or other countries will use Obama’s domestic constraints against him in this election year?  What kinds of foreign policy decisions by the current administration (if any) are more or less likely given the criticism that Obama is facing from Republican contenders and other political opponents?  Is there any way to insulate foreign policy from domestic political considerations, or is this an inevitable byproduct of democracy?