North Korean Propaganda and the Korean Conflict

The North Korean government released a new propaganda video this week. The video, complete with amateurish graphics, threatens the United States with devastation, noting that “The White House has been captured in the view of our long-range missile, and the capital of war is within the range of our atomic bomb.”

The video echoes the trailer for the 2012 remake of the Cold War classic Red Dawn. The 2012 remake positions North Korea as the invading force occupying the Pacific Northwest. (In an interesting aside, the studio spent more than a million dollars in post-production to change the enemy forces after the film had been shot. Originally, the invading army was supposed to be Chinese, but they were recast as North Koreans in an effort to expand box office earnings in China).

But while the parallels between the two are humorous, the increasing bellicosity from the North Korean regime is causing concern among Korea-watchers. The North Korean government last week announced it was invalidating the armistice that ended direct hostilities in the Korean War in 1953. It has also stepped up nuclear testing  and long range missile testing in recent months. Meanwhile, the United States is expanding operations on the Korean peninsula, engaging in joint training operations with the South Korean military this week.

North Korean belligerence seems to come in regular cycles. But the current cycle appears to be more intense that others, leading some spectators to question whether the current leader, Kim Jong Un, is more dangerous and less predictable than his father, Kim Jong Il, and grandfather, Kim Il Sung, both of whom led the country previously. Interestingly, North Korea’s closest ally, china, appears to be growing increasingly frustrated with the regime, and has supported expanding sanctions on North Korea in recent months.

What do you think? Does North Korea pose a threat to the United States and South Korea? If so, what measures should be taken to address the North Korean threat. Leave a comment below and let us know what you think.

North Korea’s Nuclear Test

South Korean Television covers the North Korean Nuclear Test

On Monday North Korea tested a nuclear device, prompting sharp criticism from the Obama administration and provoking renewed discussions of expanded sanctions in the United Nations Security Council. The Central Intelligence Agency reported that Monday’s test was more powerful than previous nuclear tests conducted by the North Korean government in 2006 and 2009.

The test, conducted in direct violation of UN Security Council resolutions, led North Korea’s closest ally, the People’s Republic of China, to summon the North Korean ambassador in protest. The North Korean government defended its action as an act of self-defense necessitated by “U.S. hostility,” and promised to continue its efforts if necessary. According to the United States and its allies, North Korea is operating in violation of its obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT.

What does the NPT actually do? The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty spells out the obligations of signatory states under three separate areas. First, non-nuclear weapons states agree not to pursue the development or deployment of nuclear weapons. Second, recognized nuclear weapons states (under the NPT, these are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, who coincidently are also the five permanent members of the UN Security Council) agree to undertake efforts towards total nuclear disarmament. Finally, the right of all states to the peaceful use of nuclear power is guaranteed.  However, there are several nuclear weapons states which are not party to the treaty. India, Israel, and Pakistan—all of which are believed to possess nuclear weapons—are non-signatories and thus fall outside the obligations of the treaty. North Korea was a signatory but formally withdrew from the agreement in 2003. Iran remains a signatory to the treaty but is believed to be developing nuclear weapons in violation of its treaty obligations. South Africa developed nuclear weapons in the 1980s but decommissioned its nuclear stockpiles in the early 1990s, making it the only state ever to voluntarily decommission an existing nuclear weapons capability.

So is North Korea in violation of its obligations? The answer depends on who you ask. The United States’ position (generally supported by the international community) is that North Korea’s nuclear program violations its international obligations. North Korea, however, regularly asserts that it withdrew from the NPT and can therefore pursue a nuclear program in its self-defense.

This, of course, raises the broader question about the effectiveness of nuclear weapons as a deterrence. The doctrine of mutually assured destruction, popularized during the Cold War, suggests that the threat of total destruction associated with the use of nuclear weapons by two nuclear weapons powers renders the use of those weapons unfeasible, as no winning strategy could result. The use of nuclear weapons is essentially self-defeating. But the threat posed by possessing nuclear weapons—indeed, the prestige of nuclear weapons—is a powerful motivator for states to pursue such weapons, often even in the face of high social and political costs, as the cases of Iran and North Korea attest.

What do you think? Does North Korea’s nuclear program present a threat to the United States? Is North Korean nuclear policy best explained as a rational pursuit of the national interest? And how does international law help us understand the debate surrounding the North Korean nuclear program? Take the poll or leave a comment and let us know what you think.

Domestic Politics, Misperception, and North Korea’s Missile Launch

North Korea's missile launch produced fear, anger, and condemnation from many in the international community. But was it really all about domestic politics?

North Korea’s provocative missile launch last week evoked a feeling of deja vu.  On its surface, it seemed to be just another instance of ”saber rattling” aimed at foreign targets–the latest act in a long series of missile launches, nuclear tests, verbal threats, and other provocations calculated to signal strength, to deter, or perhaps even to coerce or blackmail the foreign opponents of the insular Communist regime.  But there is reason to believe that this high profile launch–and many other provocative actions in world politics–are driven less by foreign policy goals than by the requirements of domestic politics.

Many analysts believe that North Korea’s missile launch was part of an effort by 28-year-old leader Kim Jong Un (who only succeeded his father Kim Jong Il last December) to consolidate power through a demonstration of strength.  In a late December blog post we detailed the challenges the young leader faced in consolidating his power, emphasizing the centrality of the military as the most powerful domestic actor and the most important part of the selectorate that would determine the next leader.  Richard Haass, the president of  the Council on Foreign Relations, writes that “…the test’s failure constitutes a humiliating setback for the country’s new leader, Kim Jong-un. It is likely that a principal reason for the launch was to signal his emergence and consolidate his authority. There is thus a real risk that he will turn to a tried and true path to accomplish the same ends.  If history is any guide, this suggests that a test of a nuclear warhead or some sort of aggressive military action — for example, an artillery strike — against South Korea could be in the offing.”

Other examples of this pattern abound.  In the Cuban Missile Crisis, analysts have linked President Kennedy’s tough response to the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba to a need to show resolve to combat domestic charges of his being “soft on Communism” after the Bay of Pigs debacle.  Similarly, Soviet leader Nikita Khruschev’s intransigence and demands for concessions such as the withdrawal of U.S. missiles in Turkey can be traced to his need to placate hardliners in the Communist party.

After the U.S.-led invasion failed to uncover evidence of Iraq’s alleged weapons of the mass destruction (WMD), Western analysts were puzzled at Saddam’s willingness to endure painful sanctions, isolation, and even war rather than simply prove to UN weapons inspectors that he had dismantled his WMD.  But after his capture, Saddam admitted that he had been bluffing in order to deter Iran–and likely to maintain his own power in the cut-throat domestic scene.  Had he admitted to disarming, it is likely that the military would have attempted a coup against him (as it reportedly had on several occasions from 1988-1990, which had encouraged him to demonstrate his toughness by invading Kuwait in August 1990).

In short, many provocative acts in world politics can be traced–at least in part, and sometimes entirely–to the requirements of domestic politics.  But foreign actors often misperceive the underlying sources of this behavior, and assume these actions are driven by aggressive designs on the world stage.  Robert Jervis, in his book Perception and Misperception in International Politics, notes that a common psychological bias is to assume other countries’ behavior is the product of a rational, unitary actor who is intentionally targeting you.  In reality, your country may just “be in the way” of the other state’s domestic political struggle.

What do you think?   How much of countries’ hostile rhetoric and behavior on the world stage can be traced to domestic politics rather than real international ambitions?  Is this less of a problem in democracies, or does the nature of democratic politics actually promote more conflict with foreign opponents?

Autocracy, Legitimacy, and the North Korean Succession

Kim Jong Un is the appointed heir to his father, Kim Jong Il. But can he navigate North Korea's internal politics and stay in power?

The news media and the blogosphere are buzzing with speculation about the fate of North Korea in the wake of Kim Jong Il’s death. At first glance, this might appear surprising: in a regime the New York Times calls an “odd mixing of…ancient Confucian monarchy with a 20th-century Stalinist cult of personality” where dynastic succession is the rule, shouldn’t Kim Jong Il’s designated heir, his son Kim Jong Un, be able to smoothly take the reins of power? The fact that many observers expect a difficult and uncertain transition reveals some often overlooked insights about autocratic regimes.

A popular stereotype pictures autocratic leaders as omnipotent: they can do whatever they want without having to worry about domestic political constraints from pesky actors like a parliament or the general public.  But political scientists have pointed out that even autocratic leaders must worry about domestic politics and must gain support from key domestic actors (often the military, the intelligence services, or powerful business leaders) in order to retain power and accomplish their policy goals.  When it comes to leadership succession, autocracies may not give power to a broad-based electorate, but they do have a more narrow ”selectorate“ made up of those actors who are ultimately responsible for selecting a leader.

In the case of North Korea, the army is clearly the most important domestic actor that any prospective leader must contend with.  Kim Jong Il’s widow, sister, and brother in law are also regarded as key elites who, along with the generals, will play a role in the leadership succession.

At this point, experts disagree about whether Kim Jong Un will be able to consolidate power and how long this might take.  But a constant in their analysis is the centrality of domestic politics in determining his fate.   For example, Georgetown’s Victor Cha believes Kim Jong Un will not survive, due to the weakness of his supporters and the enmity of the military: “The ‘great successor,’ as he has been dubbed by the state media, is surrounded by elders who are no less sick than his father and a military that chafed at his promotion to four-star general last year without having served a day in the army. Such a system simply cannot hold.”

Harvard political scientist Stephen Walt is more optimistic about Kim Jong Un’s chances, but he also emphasizes the centrality of elite politics: “If North Korea’s ruling elite understands their own fragility and recognizes the dangers that a serious power struggle might pose, then Kim Jong Un can survive by default.  Why? Because he’s the one leader that all the potential contenders can agree on, if only to avoid the dangerous uncertainties that an open contest for power would entail.”

What do you think?  Will Kim Jong Un be able to take the reins of power from hsi father, or will a nasty succession battle occur?  Will the regime survive?  How is North Korea’s current situation different from cases in which autocracies have experienced smooth power transitions?

Are Economic Sanctions Effective?

The UN Security Council has recently imposed sanctions on countries including Iran and North Korea, and is considering sanctions against Syria.

Yesterday the European Union banned all imports of Syrian oil in an effort to halt the Syrian government’s bloody crackdown on anti-regime demonstrators. In the past week or so the EU has also issued sanctions against Iran’s Al Quds military force due to its “technical and material support” for Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad’s rule and the UN has moved closer to sanctions against Syria’s leaders.  Over the past few years, the United States, the UN, and other actors have sought to curtail Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programs through economic sanctions. 

The prominence of economic sanctions as a tool of statecraft, together with the apparent intransigence of these sanctions’ targets such as North Korea, Iran, and Syria, raises serious questions.  Are sanctions actually effective in pressuring governments to change their policies?  Do they only harm the general population, or can they squeeze elites as well?  How can sanctions be made more effective?

Political scientists have addressed these questions and have arrived at some conclusions.  While differences in data and methods have produced somewhat different findings, the basic empirical results are as follows.  Economic sanctions are only successful in about a third of the cases in which they are used.  The work of Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, as reviewed here, shows that sanctions are most effective if the goal is simply destabilization of a target state (a 52% success rate) but are less effective if the objective is modest policy change  (33%) or major policy change (25%) by the target government.  Some scholars are even more pessimistic, suggesting that Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot overestimate the success of sanctions; Robert Pape argues that only 5 of their 40 claimed successes actually stand up to scrutiny.

There is also evidence that economic sanctions worsen target governments’ respect for basic human rights.  Dursun Peksen explains these findings as follows: “sanctions fail to attenuate the coercive capacity of the target elites and create more economic difficulties and political violence among ordinary citizens, [encouraging governments to] commit more human rights violations.”  Similarly Reed Wood finds that “…sanctions threaten the stability of target incumbents, leading them to augment their level of repression in an effort to stabilize the regime, protect core supporters, minimize the threat posed by potential challengers, and suppress popular dissent.”

Studies have also shown that multilateral sanctions are more effective than unilateral sanctions, and that factors including the initial stability of the target state, the length of time sanctions are in place, and the extent of trade linkages between target and sender affect the success of sanctions.  Sanctions may also be more effective when initiated by, and targeted against, democratic states.

Given this somewhat discouraging empirical evidence, should sanctions be utilized as frequently as they are today?  What are the moral and practical  implications of imposing broad-based economic sanctions as opposed to targeted “smart sanctions” against regime leaders?  In the cases of Syria, Iran, and North Korea, what other policy instruments should be the fallback if sanctions prove ineffective?

The Next Korean War

The South Korean corvette Cheonan

The South Korean government issued its final findings from its analysis of the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel last March. The report concludes that the South Korean ship was sunk by a torpedo launched by a North Korean submarine. The conclusion which provoked an immediate and sharp response from the North Korean government, which dismissed the findings as a “conspiratorial farce” and promised “all-out war” and a “nuclear fire shower” if punitive actions are taken against the Pyongyang regime.

The report (and equally importantly North Korea’s reaction to the report) raise some important questions. As Julian Borger argues, South Korea is now caught in a diplomatic (and political) black hole. There is clearly political pressure from within South Korea to respond to the sinking, which claimed the lives of some 46 South Korean sailors. But what sort of response is likely to be productive. The South Korean president is scheduled to address the United Nations Security council this week, and there will likely be discussion of sanctions. But the North Korean regime has been subject to UN sanctions for several years as a result of its ongoing nuclear program. It seems unlikely that further sanctions will fundamentally alter the regime’s policies, particularly if the Chinese government, which has historically been suspicious of sanctions against North Korea, remains hesitant to actively support them. In short, a political/diplomatic response is unlikely to be effective, while a military response is undesirable.

Further, as Ruediger Frank points out in his blog, 38 North, some of the fundamental questions surrounding the attack have not been asked. Most importantly, Frank argues,

Sinking a corvette is very different from shooting a tourist or firing a few pistol shots across the 38th parallel. It is even unlike killing an enemy with an axe in the neutral zone around Panmunjom. It is hard not to regard the deliberate sinking of a warship and the killing of 46 crewmen as an act of war. And it is hard to expect the other side not to share this view.

So who made this fatal and risky decision? Those in the West who insist on calling Kim Jong Il the Dear Leader (although this title has not been in use in North Korea for one and a half decades), who believe that he is the personification of evil and the only person with power in his country, will argue that only he could have given the order. But this assumption collides with a truism that my students learn in their first semester: the top priority of the DPRK leadership is regime survival. An open war against the South would be suicidal.”

Frank concludes that the attack may not have been launched by the North Korean government, but rather reflects the deteriorating chain of command within North Korea itself. Such a situation could be far scarier for the stability of the Korean peninsula.

Inside North Korea

The South Korean-North Korean Border (courtesy flikr)

I just rediscovered VBS TV, a group of investigative journalists who do some great reporting. They have a new documentary in which two of them manage to get into North Korea. Their report gives an unusual inside view of one of the world’s most reclusive regimes. After enduring days of indoctrination, scripted tours, and “unique” restaurants, in the final clip they conclude that the division between North Korea and the West is similar to the division between the West and the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War. The challenge, they note, is that North Korea remains an authoritarian society isolated from the rest of the world. As they note in the video, “They [North Koreans] didn’t have punk. They didn’t have jazz. They didn’t have blues. There are no cultural similarities whatsoever…This is a time machine. This is 1930s Russia; 1950s Soviet Union. So they see me as the imperialist aggressor, and I see them as the land that time forgot.”

It’s an interesting notion. And it leads to some interesting conclusions. If the threat of hard power against North Korea (in the form of sanctions or the use of military force) has been unsuccessful in deterring them from pursuing nuclear weapons, is it possible that the use of soft power could be more effective? Could student and cultural exchanges bring down the North Korean regime in a way that the threat of force could not? And if so, what does this suggest about U.S. policy toward Cuba? The Cuban embargo, which has been in place since 1960, has clearly not forced Cuba’s hand. Could cultural exchanges and social pressure be more effective in promoting change in Cuba than the threat of hard power? It’s an interesting possibility.

Five Stories You Might Have Missed

Japanese elections took place on Sunday, marking a dramatic shift in political power in the country. The Liberal Democratic Party, which has ruled Japan for nearly all of its post-World War II history, looks set to lose handily to its main rival, the Democratic Party of Japan. Some analysists are projecting the DPJ may win as many as 320 seats in the lower house, giving it a two-thirds majority and eliminating any need to form coalition partners. Prime Minister nad LDP leader Taro Aso has already conceded defeat and announced his intention to resign as party leader. With the DPJ’s victory, Yukio Hatoyama looks poised to become the country’s next prime minister.

In other news from the previous week:

1. The dispute over the status of last week’s Afghan election continues. Although incumbent President Hamid Karzai has extended his lead in the most recent results, the current tally (in which Karzai leads his main challenger, Abdullah Abdullah 46% to 31%) would still force a runoff election in October. Although final results are not expected until the end of September, Abdullah has accused the government of engaging in a “massive state-engineer[ing]” of the election results, alleging voter intimidation, ballot-box stuffing, and other election irregularities. The United States has also expressed concerns over the accusations, with U.S. Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan “mak[ing] it very clear” in a meeting with Karzai last week that the election should be free and fair.

2.  Fighting between the government of Burma and a rebel militia known as the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army broke out last week, ending a ceasefire signed between the two more than twenty years ago. The fighting, which has led to a massive exodus of refugees into China, drew criticism from the Chinese government over the weekend. China has been one of the few countries to maintain close ties to the Burmese government, but those ties have been challenged after a reported 10,000-30,000 people crossed into China to flee fighting. The Burmese government is attempting to reassert control ahead of next year’s elections over a region which has large ethnic minorities who reject the central government’s authority.

3. The United Arab Emirates announced it had seized a ship carrying North Korean arms to Iran. According to a report issued by the government of the UAE to the United Nations, the ship, which was seized several weeks ago, was carrying ammunition and small arms, including rocket-propelled grenades, in contravention of a UN embargo established under UN Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009). That resolution was passed after North Korea’s second nuclear test in May. The United Arab Emirates is a close U.S. ally in the region, and has been under pressure to step-up its screening of  shipments bound for Iran.

4. The longstanding trade dispute between Brazil and the United States will take a new turn on Monday, when the World Trade Organization is expected to rule that Brazil may infringe patents on U.S. pharmaceuticals in retaliation for U.S. subsidies on cotton. Brazil successfully challenged U.S. cotton subsides in 2002, when the WTO ruled that the $3 billion annual cotton subsidies paid by the U.S. government unfairly distorted global cotton prices. Despite the victory, the United States has continued to pay the subsidies, and the Brazilian government has struggled to find a way to enforce the ruling. If the WTO does indeed rule that Brazil may bypass U.S. intellectual property protection in the case, it may represent a new avenue for developing countries to enforce WTO rulings. More on this in a future blog entry.

5. South African President Jacob Zuma stated last week that he will be quick to condemn any “deviant” behavior during his upcoming visit to Zimbabwe. The South African government has historically been very slow to criticize the Zimbabwean government or to bring pressure on the country, which has been in the throes of an economic and political crisis for the more than five years. Meanwhile, a United Nations report last week contended that international humanitarian assistance for Zimbabwe has fallen well short of the amount needed to address the food shortages and disease outbreaks facing the country. The UN estimates Zimbabwe will require $718 million in humanitarian aid this year. So far, only $316 million has been pledged.

Five Stories You Might Have Missed

With the Congress in recess, the U.S. political scene has been dominated by coverage of town hall debates over health care reform. In the debate, the British National Health System (NHS) has been trotted out as representative of the dangers of government-run health care, charges to which the British government has responded. The Financial Times on Friday offered a balanced comparison of the U.S. and British health care systems, which debunks the selective use of statistics in the current debate.

In news from outside the U.S. health care debate last week:

1. The Taliban has stepped up attacks in Afghanistan ahead of nation-wide elections scheduled for Thursday. On Saturday, the Taliban launched a suicide bomb attack against NATO’s heavily fortified Afghanistan headquarters in Kabul, killing eight and wounding nearly 100 people. With observers already worried about the ability of the Afghan government and international elections monitors to conduct a nation-wide poll in the country, observers fear that the Taliban may attempt to disrupt the elections. The relative period of peace which had preceded Saturday’s attack had led some to believe that the Taliban would allow the elections to take place.

Thursday’s poll will pit incumbent President Hamid Karzai against former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah. Although many observers believed Karzai’s campaign enjoyed an insurmountable advantage, Abdullah’s campaign has managed to close the gap, and some are now forecasting the need for a run-off election in October. A runoff would be necessary if neither candidate manages to secure an absolute majority of the vote.
 
2. Palestinian authorities in Gaza engaged in a series of small battles against Jund Ansar Allah, on Friday. The shootouts resulted in at least 13 deaths and dozens wounded. The battles represented the latest—and perhaps most serious—challenge to the Hamas-led government in Gaza. Jund Ansar Allah is one of several small extremist groups pushing for the introduction of strict Sharia law in Gaza. Jund Ansar Allah, which claims ties to al-Qaeda, had labeled Gaza an Islamic emirate subject to theocratic law, a claim which Hamas rejects. For its part, the Hamas government has dismissed challenges to its leadership as “Zionist propaganda” sponsored by the Israeli government.

3. The French Minister for Urban Regeneration, Fadela Amara, sparked a national debate last week when she called for a nation-wide ban on wearing the burka in France. Amara, a French national of Algerian decent, said that the burka represents “the oppression of women, their enslavement, their humiliation.” Banning the burka, she said, must be part of a broader effort to welcome moderate Islam while fighting the “gangrene, the cancer of radical Islam which completely distorts the message of Islam.” Amara’s comments are part of a broader debate in France. The national parliament in July established a committee to determine whether the wearing of the burka is “compatible with France’s republican tradition of equality between men and women,” and French President Nicolas Sarkozy in June said the burka “will not be welcome on the territory of the republic.” An estimated 5-10 percent of the French population is Muslim, though only a few thousand wear the burka.

4. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak last week attempted to re-open talks with North Korea, offering to negotiate troop reductions along the border between the two countries. The border between North and South Korea is among the most militarized in the world, with more than one million troops, including 30,000 U.S. troops, based in the area. However, in his offer, Lee reiterated the South Korean position that a comprehensive peace deal between the two countries would be predicated on North Korea abandoning its nuclear efforts, a proposition with the North has consistently rejected in the past.

5. Continuing her Africa tour with visits to Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo last week, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke out on several of the continent’s hot spots. Last week, she urged political reconciliation in Kenya and offered support for Somali efforts to fight piracy and Islamic extremism, During her tour, she has not shied away from provoking controversy. In Nigeria, she criticized “the lack of transparency and accountability [which] has eroded the legitimacy of the government.” She also called for African governments to toughen their stance on Robert Mugabe’s government in Zimbabwe.

Five Stories You Might Have Missed

Economic data out this week suggests that the end of the global recession may be nearing. The most recent jobless numbers out of the United States gave economists reason to celebrate, as the unemployment rate declined by 1/10 of a point, leading to a price rally on Wall Street. Germany, which has seen a sharp decline in gross domestic product (glossary) during the global recession, benefitted from an unexpected expansion of exports—7 percent in June. While other countries continue to struggle, including Russia and Iceland, many economists now believe we are seeing the proverbial light at the end of the tunnel.

In other news from the previous week:

1. The trial of dozens of people, including a French national and two Iranians employed in the British and French embassies began in Iran on Saturday. The defendants are charged with espionage and “acting against national security” by taking part in and reporting on post-election protests to Western embassies. Under Iranian law, a conviction on either charge could be punished by death. Several of the defendants have confessed, but Western governments have dismissed the charges as “baseless” and contend the confessions were made under duress. The government of Iran accuses the United States and Britain of interfering in its internal affairs by “proving financial help to Iran’s opposition.” Meanwhile, the trial of 100 opposition leaders continued last week. The opposition leaders have condemned the trials as a spectacle, but the defendants face charges punishable by death. Opposition leaders continue to assert that the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad in June’s disputed presidential election was the result of electoral fraud. Nevertheless, Ahmadi-Nejad was sworn in on Monday.

2. A power struggle inside Taliban in Pakistan emerged over the weekend after the organization’s top leader, Baitullah Mehsud, was killed in a U.S. drone strike on Friday. Mehsud was a powerful figure in the Waziristan district of Pakistan, and Pakistani officials believe he was responsible for nearly all of the major terrorist attacks in Pakistan over the past two years, including the assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto and the bombing of Marriot Hotel in Islamabad in 2008. Many analysts believe that Mehsud’s death will undermine the ability of the Taliban to operate in Pakistan. Already, political infighting in the Taliban in Pakistan’s leadership has led to the murder of one top leader by another, as Waliur Rehman, a leading contender to lead the organization, killed Hakimullah Mehsud, a rival for the same position. Pakistani intelligence now believes the organization is likely to splinter into several factions, each operating independently, but collectively much weaker than the original organization.

3. Former President Bill Clinton met with North Korean President Kim Jong-il this week, securing the release of two American journalists who had been sentenced to twelve years of hard labor for illegally entering the country. The meeting, which the White House maintains was not part of its official diplomatic efforts to address the challenges posed by the North Korean regime, was the highest level contact between the two countries in more than ten years. The Obama administration also reminded North Korea that, despite Clinton’s trip, that the United States will continue its efforts to increase diplomatic and financial pressure on the North Korean state unless it abandons efforts to secure nuclear weapons.

4. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton began her Africa tour this week, meeting with Kenyan officials on Wednesday. Clinton is hoping to apply pressure on the coalition government to move forward with political reforms intended to bring grater stability to the country and to prevent another flare up of the violence which rocked the country after February’s disputed presidential election.

On Thursday, Clinton met with Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, the embattled president of Somalia. Clinton used the opportunity to reiterate U.S. support for the Ahmed government, pledging to provide more military and economic assistance as the government continues its battle against Islamist insurgents. Meanwhile, in neighboring Eritrea, President Isaias Afewerki, who is believed to be a supporter of rebel groups in Somalia, dismissed U.S. efforts, saying that it is unrealistic to try and “imposing [a government] that doesn’t exist in reality.” Somalia has long topped Foreign Policy’s list of failed states. The lack of an effective central state has also made the country a haven for pirates in the Gulf of Aden.

5. A series of cyber-attacks aimed at social networking sites last week were believed to be directed at one individual—a blogger posting under the name of Cyxymu Livejournal. The denial-of-service attacks targeted several popular sites, including Facebook, Twitter, Google, and the blogging site Livejournal. Cyxymu Livejournal is a critic of Russian policy in the Caucuses, particularly Georgia. According to some sources, the Russian government has used denial-of-service attacks in the past, targeting sites critical of the Russian government in Georgia, Estonia, and Eastern Europe. But if responsible for the most recent round of attacks, this could represent an expansion of the strategy. Leading credence to the theory is the fact that this week marked the one year anniversary of the Russian-Georgian War over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.