President Kennedy Pauses for Reflection During the Crisis
Today marks the 50th anniversary of the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis. On October 27, 1960, a US U-2 spy plane was shot down over Cuba by a Soviet missile crew. The crisis began two week earlier, when CIA flights located and identified Soviet missile installations on the island. By October 27, the options had been considered, the blockade/quarantine had been imposed, and secret negotiations were underway.
On October 27, however, the CIA reported that at least five separate missile sites appeared to be fully operational. With tensions running high, both sides were on the brink of full-scale nuclear war. Indeed, “Black Saturday” as it came to be known, marked the closest both sides would get to a full-scale nuclear exchange during the Cold War. On several occasions on that day, we were a whisker hair away. For example:
After the first U2 plane was shot down, the US sent another. It was decided at the time that the second flight was ordered that because antiaircraft missile batteries in Cuba were under direct Soviet control, a second downed plane would represent an escalation on the part of the Soviets, and the US would respond with a full-scale attack against Cuba. This would have necessitated a Soviet response, likely by invading US allies in Europe. Fortunately, according to McNamara’s recollection, Soviet Premier Khrushchev had reached a similar conclusion and ordered the Soviet commander in Cuba to refrain from responding to US over flights of the island.
In an effort to dissuade Soviet submarines from reaching Cuba, the US Navy was
dropping “signaling depth charges” on the Soviet Foxtrot-class B-59 diesel-electric submarine. Unknown to the US Navy at the time, the B-59 was equipped with nuclear-tipped torpedoes and had orders to launch them if the submarine’s hull was breached. The decision to launch the nuclear torpedoes required the concurrence of the three ranking officers. While two concurred, the third, Vasili Arkhipov, refused, and the torpedoes were never launched.
Another U2 spy plane accidently made an unauthorized ninety-minute flight over the far eastern coast of the Soviet Union. This prompted the Soviets to launch interceptors from their bases in the region. The US similarly scrambled American fighters armed with nuclear air-to-air missiles over the Bering Sea. The U2 spy plane was recalled, and there was no engagement between the fighters.
The same day, Khrushchev received a letter written by Cuban President Fidel Castro in which Castro urged the Soviet Union to use its nuclear force to defend Cuba in the event of an attack. In the letter, dubbed “the Armageddon Letters,” Castro writes, “I believe the imperialists’ aggressiveness is extremely dangerous and if they actually carry out the brutal act of invading Cuba in violation of international law and morality, that would be the moment to eliminate such danger forever through an act of clear legitimate defense, however harsh and terrible the solution would be.” The US had active plans to launch an invasion of Cuba, and had already warned its NATO allies in Europe that, “the situation is growing shorter… the United States may find it necessary within a very short time in its interest and that of its fellow nations in the Western Hemisphere to take whatever military action may be necessary.”
The crisis itself was averted the morning of October 28, when Kennedy and Khrushchev agreed to deescalate the crisis. The Soviet Union agreed to withdraw its missiles from Cuba. In exchange, the United States agreed to issue a speech at the United Nations in which it promised to recognize the inviolability of Cuba’s borders, its sovereignty, and to refrain from interfering in its internal affairs. The United States also secretly agreed to remove US missiles from Italy and Turkey.
Fifty years ago, the Cuban missile crisis brought the world to the brink of nuclear disaster. During the standoff, U.S. President John F. Kennedy thought the chance of escalation to war was “between 1 in 3 and even,” and what we have learned in later decades has done nothing to lengthen those odds. We now know, for example, that in addition to nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, the Soviet Union had deployed 100 tactical nuclear weapons to Cuba, and the local Soviet commander there could have launched these weapons without additional codes or commands from Moscow. The U.S. air strike and invasion that were scheduled for the third week of the confrontation would likely have triggered a nuclear response against American ships and troops, and perhaps even Miami. The resulting war might have led to the deaths of 100 million Americans and over 100 million Russians.
So why were we able to avoid the devastation to which Alison refers? Realists and liberals offer competing explanations.
For realists, American military superiority made the Soviets less likely to follow through on their threats. At the time, the United States had a 17 to 1 advantage in nuclear capability. Assuming rationality, Khrushchev could not stand up to the United States nor force them to back down. Left with no other choice, Khrushchev backed down.
But what about personal motivation? Both Kennedy and Khrushchev understood that neither side could win a nuclear exchange. Both were afraid that once conflict started, it would escalate beyond control. Clear lines of communication (and thus empathy) between Kennedy and Khrushchev would allow them to recognize and overcome the no-win situation. Indeed, after the crisis was resolved, a red phone system was set up to facilitate direct communication between the White House and the Kremlin.
What do you think? Is the realist or the liberal explanation of the Cuban Missile Crisis more compelling? Or does another approach offer a richer understanding. Take the poll and let us know what you think.
Mark Twain popularized the saying (originally attributed to British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli), “There are three kinds of lies: lies, damn lies, and statistics.” The use of statistics to manipulate the reader or obfuscate the truth is an old practice. Indeed, as Thomas Carlisle noted in his 1839 book Chartism, “A witty statesman said, you can prove anything by figures.” And HG Wells argued that “Statistical thinking will one day be as necessary for efficient citizenship as the ability to read and write.”
The growing availability of data makes basic statistical literacy ever more important. An editorial in the New York Times earlier this year proclaimed that we are now living in the “Age of Big Data,” when the widespread collection and tracking of data necessitates individuals who are capable of making sense of it all. Google searches, Facebook profiles, customer profiling, and the like create mountains of information waiting to be analyzed. Employers want people who are capable of understanding and making sense of these data. The National Association of Colleges and Employers 2012 survey lists both the “ability to analyze quantities data” and the “ability to obtain and process information” among its top skills desired by employers.
Yet a recent story in the British Telegraph concludes that “statistical illiteracy leaves citizens at risk of being duped by politicians and businessmen.” Their alarming conclusion led The Guardian’s Datablog to create a simple quiz that
While political science programs across the country frequently require a methods component, many have not focused on the more basic questions of statistical literacy. It is important for our students to understand the fundamentals of research design. But shouldn’t we also be teaching them about the use (and misuse) of statistics?
Williams’ video would make an outstanding supplemental “reading” assignment for any political science course concerned with developing data and statistical literacy skills.
How do you teach these skills? Are these skills taught in a specific course or developed throughout the major? What assignments and activities do you use to teach these skills? Share your feedback with us below.
Scotland’s First Minister Alex Salmond (left) and British Prime Minister David Cameron (right) sign an agreement to hold a referendum on Scottish independence in 2014.
Earlier this week, the British and Scottish governments reached an historic agreement that would see Scotland hold a referendum asking voters to decide whether Scotland would become an independent country or remain as part of the United Kingdom. Numerous issues are at stake, not least of which is control of the estimated 20 billion barrels of oil and natural gas located under the North Sea.
There is good reason to think that British Prime Minister David Cameron is making a strong political move. While the Scottish National Party has polled well in recent elections, the idea of Scottish independence is much less popular than the party which supports it. A recent poll found that only 34 percent of Scottish voters supported independence, while more than half believed Scotland’s economy would suffer if it declared independence.
The move towards a referendum on Scottish independence raises one of the classic challenges of global politics: the problem of national sovereignty. The idea of national sovereignty links the concepts of state (the physical territory) and nation (the people who inhabit that territory and share a common sense of belonging). Within a country, the idea of legitimacy links the people and the state through the concept of sovereignty. The right of the state to exercise power, according to political thought since the Enlightenment, is rooted in the social contract. Since the end of World War II, and particularly since the end of the Cold War, the legitimacy of nondemocratic states has been strongly questioned.
The problem, of course, is at what level such popular consent takes place. The historical patterns of development has resulted in international legal boundaries between states which rarely correlate neatly with the common identity of those who inhabit those states. Indeed, it is relatively rare for the geographic boundaries of the political entity of the state and the cultural/ethnic entity of the nation to correlate much at all. Yet the tidy nation-state represents the ideal type of international relations.
Far more common are multinational states, countries in which multiple nations often compete for control of the state. Nigeria is perhaps the most well-known example. There, more than 250 ethnic groups—the three largest of which comprise about two-thirds of the population—compete for power. One of the most important legacies of colonialism in Africa was the creation of lasting political boundaries that bare little correlation to the politics on the ground, often undermining the sovereignty and legitimacy of the post-colonial state.
The status of the United Kingdom is similarly complicated by its history. There, four distinct “countries” are united. England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland exist as “countries within a country.” Over the past twenty years, political authority has increasingly devolved from the unitary state. Political power has been decentralized away from London and towards regional governments. Independence in Scotland would represent a dramatic culmination of that (admittedly much slower) historical trend.
And other groups might be watching. Around the world, there are countless groups who identify themselves as stateless nations. The Palestinians are perhaps the most well-known, but others include the Basques in Spain, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Uighurs in China, the Hmong in Southeast Asia, and the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey
What do you think: Should Scotland declare independence? What would the political, economic, and social implications of such a move likely be? And how would Scottish independence affect the claims of other nationalist groups seeking independence, such as the Basques, Tamils, or Kurds? Take the poll below or leave a comment and let us know what you think.
Jose Manuel Barroso and Herman Van Rompuy respond to the announcement of the award.
Most observers were surprised when the Nobel Committee awarded the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize to the European Union on Friday. Newspapers from across the continent described the decision as “surprising,” “strange,” “timely,” and even “shocking.” Few anticipated the award.
In an editorial in Belgium’s La Libre Belgique, Oliver le Bussy argued that “the Nobel committee wanted to remind people that the European project… has had a civilising effect, making a large contribution to turning ancient enemies into partners and spreading democracy and human rights.” Spain’s El Pais echoed this sentiment, arguing that the prize provided “moral support and encouragement to overcome individual nations’ reservations, which impede decisive progress” towards greater integration, including “naturally, political union.”
Some, however, were more skeptical. The British papers provided a wide range of criticism. But perhaps the most powerful critique was Thomas Kirchner’s piece in the Sueddeutsche Zeitung, in which he describes the EU as a “ quarreling bunch of more or less bankrupt states” and says the Nobel committee “must be careful if it wants its decisions to be taken seriously for much longer.”
Was the Nobel Committee off course in its decision? The answer depends on your time frame of analysis. Certainly the European Union has been plagued by fiscal crises over the past several years. Its inability to develop a coherent response to the Greek crisis (let alone to respond in a meaningful way to Portugal and Spain) raise real concerns about the future of the organization.
But the history of the European Union deserve recognition. As the European Union positions itself increasingly as a single market with a single currency, it’s easy to forget the roots of the organization in the aftermath of World War II. At that time, the primary focus of European integration was simple: prevent war between Germany and France. Guided by the principles of institutional liberalism, the founders of the European Union sought to expand political, social, and above all economic cooperation between Germany and France in an effort to prevent future wars.
And from this perspective, the Nobel Peace Prize makes much more sense. The thought of war between Germany and France—really between any two members of the European Union—appears laughable today. So while the European Union struggles with fiscal recovery and economic reconstruction, it is important to remember roots as an institution of international political stability.
Still, there were many others who might have won the award. CNN’s Frida Ghitis described the decision as a “missed opportunity” and contended the award could have been more productive in achieving its goal of promoting international peace had it been awarded to someone else. She singles out Malalal Yousafzani, the 14 year old Pakistani girl shot by Talibani militants for advocating education for girls, as particularly worthy. Ahead of the decision, the bookmaking site NicerOdds was giving best odds to Gene Sharp, a political theorist of nonviolence, and Sima Samar, chair of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Sudan.
What do you think? Did the Nobel Committee did it make the right decision in recognizing the organization’s history? Or did it miss the mark in awarding the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize to the European Union? And who do you think should have won the award? Let us know what you think by leaving a comment or answering the poll question below.
The challenge for Greece is that the plan is highly unpopular, and the country has been rocked by several rounds of widespread protest. The Greek economy has collapsed, contracting by 20 percent over the last year alone. Yet absent external relief from the IMF and EU, Greece faces the prospect of bankruptcy and potential expulsion from the eurozone. And outside of Greece, observers in Spain, Portugal, and other troubled eurozone economies are watching developments closely.
The current conundrum in Greece illustrates some of the economic challenges of the common European currency. In normal times, a common currency presents clear benefits. It facilitates closer and more efficient management of the economy, reduces transaction barriers and cost of trade between countries sharing the currency, and can help to reduce economic uncertainty. Indeed, when the euro was adopted as the exclusive currency in the eurozone in 2002, it was highly popular, and many eurozone members enthusiastically embraced the new currency.
At the same time, though, the common currency presents a key challenge, particularly during economic downturns. Traditionally, governments have two economic toolkits available to them. Fiscal policy, advocated most famously by John Maynard Keynes, focuses on the use of government revenue (taxation) and expenditures (spending) to influence economic activity in the country. Keynes argued that in good times, governments should run a budget surplus so that during poor economic times, it would have ample revenue to spend, including running a deficit, and prevent a deep recession or depression.
Monetary policy, on the other hand, focuses on manipulation of the money supply, often through interest rates, to promote economic growth and stability. Monetary policy, which was most famously promoted by Milton Friedman, provides that governments should lower interest rates to promote economic growth, but should engage in contractionary policies (including raising interest rates) to prevent the economy from overheating. Above all, monetary policy focuses on maintaining a stable money supply and money value, and keeping inflation as close to zero as possible.
In practice, governments regularly use a combination of both monetary and fiscal policy to manage economic growth and stability. However, the eurozone encompasses a wide range of countries and economies, ranging from the economic powerhouse of Germany to the crisis-ridden economies of Greece, Spain, and Portugal, to a large number of smaller economies somewhere in the middle. The question of how to balance competing demands across all eurozone economies presents a challenge. The monetary policies that would maintain economic stability and growth in Germany are different from the monetary policies that might be used to prevent economic collapse in Greece. Consequently, the European Central Bank faces the challenge of finding a fine line to walk between the two.
The other challenge, of course, is that because Greece is a member of the eurozone, it effectively has cut off one of the two primary economic policies governments might use to address the economic crisis. While the Greek government can continue to use fiscal policy, its ability to use monetary policy to address the crisis is sharply limited by the fact that the Greek government does not control the Greek currency.
Not that leaving the eurozone would make things better for Greece. For now, it appears the Greek government is committed to remaining in the seventeen nation eurozone, and the German government is committed to helping Greece remain there. But if Greece is unable to reach agreement with the troika, exiting the eurozone, either on its own terms or aftering being forced out by the other members, may be Greece’s only option.
What do you think? Do the benefits of eurozone membership outweigh the costs for the Greek government? Should Greece make the sharp spending cuts demanded by the international community to remain part of the eurozone? How would Greece leaving the eurozone affect future economic developments in other troubled European economies, like Spain and Portugal? Let us know what you think by leaving a comment or answering the poll question below.
A Syrian mortar round explodes in the Turkish town of Akcakale.
On Wednesday, a Syrian mortar round landed in a Turkish village along the border between the two countries, killing five Turkish civilians. The incident sparked a sharp response from the government of Turkey, which launched a military operation shelling Syrian positions along the border.
Actors on both sides are attempting to manage the escalating crisis. Thousands of anti-war protesters on Friday took to the streets in Turkey, protesting against military conflict with Syria. The Turkish government also appears to be maintaining a proportional response, for fear that it not outrun the policies of its NATO allies. A statement by the United Nations Security Council condemned the Syrian mortar attack and urged parties to exercise restraint. The Russian government, arguably Syria’s closest ally, urged Syria to issue a statement describing the attack as a mistake.
In its efforts to respond to the Syrian attack, the Turkish government must walk a fine line. It seems clear that Turkey does not want the conflict with Syria to expand. Nor does the Syrian government, which is already engaged in a protracted civil war, want war with Turkey. The ability of two to manage the crisis would appear to rest on their ability to prevent the conflict from escalating. It seems likely that that Turkish government will attempt to keep its response proportionate to the original attack. As long as Syria perceives that response proportional, it will likely allow Turkey to proceed. But whether the two are able to manage the crisis, or whether the crisis outruns both their efforts, remains to be seen.