Category Archives: Roskin Countries and Concepts 10/e

The New International (Economic) Order

Leaders of Brazil, Russia, China, and India at the First BRIC Summit in Ekaterinburg, Russia.

Leaders of Brazil, Russia, China, and India at the First BRIC Summit in Ekaterinburg, Russia.

Blogging at Foreign Policy, David Rothkopf recently raised some interesting questions with respect to the rise of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). The recent meeting of the BRIC countries (plus South Africa) in China did not develop any policies or organizations. But it did stand in stark contrast, he argues, to the NATO effort in Libya. While the BRICs were able to offer a (reasonably) coordinated position on Libya, NATO appears to be in disarray. In Rothkopf’s observation,

NATO is at a watershed. The Libya “moment,” which President Obama and others wanted to offer up as an example of a new robust, American-led multilateralism, is quickly morphing into a demonstration of NATO’s weaknesses. America wants to be accorded the respect of being the leader but is hamstrung by domestic problems and a lack of strategic clarity. France and Britain seem willing to pick up the slack but others won’t follow. Germany seems increasingly uncomfortable with the burdens placed on it as Europe’s de facto leading power. The military alliance is overly dependent on U.S. power. There are too many chefs. There is not enough overall mission clarity.

Meanwhile, even while the BRICS are a long, long way from being politically cohesive, they are rent with divisions over important issues, and they have zero aspirations to anything as formal or as action-oriented as an alliance, they do have a few things going for them that make them powerful…The Atlantic alliance may be where much of the money and power has been. The “BRICS Plus” represents not only the bulk of the world’s people and resources but also where the fastest growth is.

The G-20 is increasingly forced to recognize the important role of the BRICs. Brazil’s continuing defiance on the issue of currency controls provide but one example. And while the BRICs continue to be excluded from other key positions in the international community—most notably, with the exception of China, from permanent representation on the UN Security Council—they are nevertheless making their presence felt. The interesting question is how the BRICs will shape the international community moving forward. While suggestions that the United States and its western allies are in decline may be overstated, it does seem clear that the international community will increasingly need to accommodate a greater diversity of interests, represented in part by the BRICs, moving forward.

Peacekeeping or Peacemaking in the Ivory Coast

The conflict in the Ivory Coast (Côte d’Ivoire) appears to be reaching its zenith this week, as supporters of president-elect Alassane Ouattara are moving on Abidjan, the center of incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo’s support. The current fighting is the recent developing in a longstanding conflict in the Ivory Coast, which divides the country, in part, along sectarian lines between northern Muslims and southern Christians.

Abidjan, the Ivory Coast's largest city.

Abidjan, the Ivory Coast's largest city.

The decline of the Ivory Coast marks the tragic end of what was once a promising African success story. After independence, the Ivory Coast was able to martial its cocoa exports—accounting for approximately 40 percent of the world’s total production—into dramatic economic development in the 1960s and 70s. However, beginning in the 1980s, the Ivory Coast’s economy entered a sharp decline, prompted in part by sharp declines in markets for its major export commodities—coffee and cocoa. A military coup in 1999 was followed by an outbreak of civil war in 2002. French peacekeeping forces, authorized to operate on behalf of the United Nations and referred to as UNOCI, or the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, entered the country in 2003 in order to keep parties separated and to help oversee national elections. Those elections, which had been postponed by the Gbagbo government several times, were finally held in October, 2010. The results were sharply disputed, as the government of the Ivory Coast declaring Gbagbo the winner while international elections monitors declared Ouattara the winner. The standoff soon devolved into direct military conflict, sparking widespread concerns about a humanitarian disaster and raising the specter of genocide. (The BBC offers a good overview of the history of the conflict).

UN forces in the Ivory Coast.

UN forces in the Ivory Coast.

On Monday, French forces participating in the UN mission launched a series of attacks intended to destabilize Gbagbo’s regime. This move marks a dramatic shift in the role of the international community in the Ivory Coast as well as a dramatic departure from the traditional role of United Nations peacekeeping forces more generally. The first point is relatively straightforward. While the international community has been actively involved in promoting regime change in some countries (read: Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan), it has maintained a wait-and-see approach in others (read: Egypt, Bahrain, and Ivory Coast). The Daily Show’s Jon Stewart and John Oliver combined to offer an incredibly insightful analysis of the differences last week.

But more broadly, the decision of French peacekeeping forces to directly engage Gbagbo’s military marks a dramatic shift in the nature of UN intervention more generally. Historically, UN peacekeeping forces were precisely that—forces intended to monitor a peace already established by combatants. After the fiasco of United Nations Operation in Somalia II in 1993, when the United States intervened to support aid distribution in Mogadishu only to be rebuffed by militias loyal to Mohamed Farrah Aidid. Since that time, the United States has resisted efforts by the United Nations to cross the fuzzy line that separates peacekeeping and peacemaking. Does the Ivory Coast mark a change in that position? Probably not. It’s a risky strategy, as Peter Gowan, blogging at the Global Dashboard notes. But it is worthwhile noting that the French policy appears to have been at least partially successful. Since those engagements, several high-ranking officials previously loyal to Gbagbo have stepped down, and Gbagbo himself seems to be willing to negotiate a cease-fire.

The Politics of Parliamentary Systems

Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper

Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper

Two parties fell from power last week, trigging election. In Portugal, the government of Prime Minister José Sócrates fell after a no-confidence motion was passed by the five opposition parties over spending cuts and tax increases intended to address the ongoing economic crisis in the country. A general election looks likely to take place in May or June. Meanwhile, in Canada, Stephen Harper’s minority Conservative government fell after three opposition parties passed a no-confidence motion in response to a finding in the House of Commons that found Harper’s government in contempt of parliament. Harper’s government was found to have provided falls information to parliament on at least three separate occasions. New elections are scheduled to take place on May 2.

The collapse of Sócrates’ government in Portugal and Harper’s government in Canada highlight both the strengths and weaknesses of parliamentary systems. Unlike presidential systems, where legislative terms are fixed and elections are set according to a regular schedule, parliamentary systems usually only have a maximum length of time between elections, normally five years. Elections can—and indeed, often do—come earlier. The government may call an early election if it feels that doing so can give it a larger majority in parliament. And opposition parties may force an early election by passing a no-confidence motion.

Both country’s upcoming elections should provide interesting political theatre. In Canada, public opinion polling is suggesting that Harper’s Conservative Party will likely win a plurality of seats but be denied an absolute majority in the House of Commons, the country’s parliament. If this happens, it will either be forced to seek coalition partners to establish a government, or (more likely) it will try to rule as a minority government again. The problem is that minority governments are inherently unstable, as the government is forced to cobble together a majority vote on every issue from an unstable and often shifting group of Members of Parliament from other parties.

In Portugal, the stakes are perhaps even larger. There, the collapse of Sócrates’ government came just days before the European Union was scheduled to decide on a rescue package for the Portuguese economy. That package, which was conditioned on the government of Portugal enacting strict (and widely unpopular) austerity measures, now appears to be in jeopardy. But the ability of the E.U. to discipline the government of Portugal may be limited, as any spillover of the economic crisis from Portugal could endanger the stability of the euro, the common currency used in fifteen E.U. economies, including Spain, France, and Germany.

The G7 and Japanese Currency Markets

Japanese yenThe G7, a loose association of the world’s seven wealthiest countries, took the unusual step yesterday of backing intervention in Japanese currency markets. In the aftermath of the devastating earthquake and tsunami, the value of the Japanese yen had been pushed to record highs by markets (and currency speculators) anticipating Japanese companies repatriating funds to help rebuild lost production capacity. In hopes of keeping its currency value stable, the Japanese government injected 60 trillion yen (more than $740 billion) into the economy over a four day period following the crisis. But despite these efforts the yen climbed to its highest levels since World War II last week, peaking at 77 yen per dollar last week.

So what’s the worry? Currency values are important in determining exports, imports, and balance of trade. In general, a weaker currency means more competitive exports. This is why countries sometimes risk the specter of competitive devaluation, as the United States has accused China in recent years. But in the case of the Japanese yen, the challenge is much greater. An increase in the value of the yen could weaken the Japanese economic recovery. But more importantly, there was concern that it could also hamper the rebuilding effort by sapping much needed wealth from the market.

Historically, the G7 (as well as its individual member states) have been hesitant to intervene in foreign exchange markets, guided by the perception that it simply doesn’t work, or that the dangers outweigh the possible benefits. This is why the G7 maneuver is so unusual.

Globalization and the Japanese Crisis

Japanese disaster workers search for survivors.

Japanese disaster workers search for survivors.

The devastation wrought on Japan by the recent earthquake and tsunami is now being compounded by the threat of a meltdown at the Fukushima nuclear reactors. The humanitarian impact is overwhelming—by some estimates, as many as 10,000 people have likely already perished, and some half a million have been rendered homeless. The Japanese government is struggling to get the situation under control, and international humanitarian assistance is being mobilized in support.

The crisis in Japan also serves to illustrate the extent to which the world is increasingly globalized. According to a post at the Financial Times’ Brussels Blog, the European Union is screening Japanese food imports for radiation. While Japanese food exports to Europe are not particularly large—amounting to an estimated 64.8 million euros in 2010—European regulators assert they are acting out of precaution to prevent food contaminated by radioactivity from entering European markets.

Then there’s this post by Amy Lee at the Huffington Post. According to Lee, we should expect severe disruptions in global supply chains, particularly for consumer electronics, as a result of the Japanese crisis. Lee notes that Japan is responsible for 14 percent of global production in computers and other consumer electronics. Further, Japan is responsible for the production of approximately 60 percent of the silicon wafers used in the production of the semiconductor chips in nearly every electronic device. Widespread damage to production facilities have already forced many leading producers, including Sony, Toshiba, Panasonic, and Texas Instruments. Damage to Japanese infrastructure may affect exports even after the plants are brought back online.

The use of global commodity chains, in which complex products like automobiles or computers are assembled from components produced around the world, has created a system of global production that may be more efficient, but is also more susceptible to disruption. Compounding this, Japan’s perfection of the just-in-time manufacturing method, which reduces costs by keeping inventories low, means that there is little slack in the system. According to Lee, the global consumer electronics supply chain has about two week’s worth of excess stock that will offset disruptions caused by the Japanese crisis. After that, it could take six months for the supply chain to reintegrate. Until then, we can expect to see price increases and shortages for many consumer electronics.

International Women’s Day at the Status of Female Politicians

Marine LePen, Leader of the French National Front.

Marine LePen, Leader of the French National Front.

Yesterday marked the 100th annual International Women’s Day. There was much coverage of the importance of the day in the blogosphere, including some very good coverage by the GuardianOxfam’s Duncan Green  and lots of discussion of the ongoing pay gap between men and women globally.

But two sites really stood out to me. First, the Women in World Parliaments website (maintained by the Inter-Parliamentary Union) offered some updated data on the status of female representation globally. It notes that regionally, the Nordic countries lead the world in equality of representation for women, with the national parliaments comprised of 41.6 percent women, nearly twice the average the next closest region (the Americas at 22.6%), and nearly four times as high as the last-placed region (Arab States, at 11.7%). The comparative data at the national level is also very interesting. Looking only at the lower houses, we find that women are best-represented in Rwanda, with 56.3 percent of the lower house comprised of women. The top ten (with some interesting surprises) are as follows:

  1. Rwanda (56.3%)
  2. Sweden (45.0%)
  3. South Africa (44.5%)
  4. Cuba (43.2%)
  5. Iceland (42.9%)
  6. The Netherlands (40.7%)
  7. Finland (40.0%)
  8. Norway (39.6%)
  9. Belgium (39.3%)
  10. Mozambique (39.2%) 

Rounding out the bottom, ten states tied for last place, with no women in the national parliaments: Belize, Micronesia, Nauru, Oman, Palau, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Tuvalu.

The second very interesting coverage was offered by Gideon Rachman, blogging at the Financial Times. Exploring the most recent polling data from France, he notes that Marine LePen, the daughter of Jean-Marie LePen and head of the far-right National Party, appears to be polling at the top of preferred presidential candidates. In 2002, Marine LePen’s father, Jean-Marie LePen, won the first round of the French presidential ballot, only to be soundly defeated by Jacques Chirac. France’s presidential election system requires that the winner be elected with a majority of votes cast. Because multiple parties contest the election, a runoff election between the top two vote getters in the first round is the norm.

In the 2002 elections, Le Pen’s radical views placed him far outside the mainstream of the French electorate. LePen had been accused of xenophobia and anti-Semitism. During the 2002 campaign, he was dogged by statements he had previously made, including advocating the forced isolation of people infected with HIV and accusing his rival, Jacques Chirac, of being on the payroll of Jewish organizations.

As the According to Rachman, Marine LePen presents a similar far-right worldview but lacks the divisive baggage of her father. A victory in round one of the Frecnch presidential elections appears possible. However, a round two defeat to whoever is chosen to run against LePen appears equally probable, and given the current state of the French economy, it could be Socialist Martine Aubry that wins the national election. Either way, it’s a female president for France in 2012.

Measuring Progress: The Failure of the United States?

Blogging at the Global Dashboard, Alex Evans posted an interesting graph comparing the International Monetary Fund’s “advanced economy” countries across a number of measures. The graphic is reposed here:

As Evans notes, the graphic paints a pretty sad picture about the standing of the United States in several key measures of development, including income inequality, food insecurity, life expectancy, prison population, and student performance in math and science. In all of these categories, the United States ranks at or near the bottom of the 33 countries included in the study. Despite having the largest economy in the world, the United States has not been able to translate its economic prowess into social development as effectively as many of our fellow developed countries have.

It’s enough to make one rethink the whole development project.

Democratization and Popular Protest in the Middle East

Libyan Protestors in Benghazi city.

Libyan Protestors in Benghazi city.

For several weeks I’ve resisted the temptation to blog on groundswell of popular protest rocketing across the Middle East. In part, my hesitation was driven by the expansive coverage already offered by some of the best bloggers on the internet: Daniel Drezner, David Rothkopf, Duncan GreenGideon Rachman, and Stephen Walt have all blogged on events in recent days. In part, my hesitation was also driven by the excellent coverage offered by the Daily Show  in recent days as well. But recent events in Libya, where Moammar Gadhafi, who has been in power for more than 40 years, has been engaged in a desperate struggle to put down popular protests by ordinary Libyans demanding democratization—and more specifically a recent blog post by political scientist Benjamin Barber—sparked my curiosity.

Benjamin Barber is probably already well-known to most readers of this blog. His work on democratic politics (strong vs. thin democracy) as well as his work on globalization (Jihad vs. McWorld) make him a staple in most comparative politics and international relations programs. Writing at the Huffington Post last week, Barber made the case that whether or not Gadhafi is able to hold on to power Libya will likely face ongoing domestic turmoil—if not outright civil war—rather than the establishment of a democratic polis.

In Egypt, despite the success of popular protests in forcing the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak, there is similar reason to suspect that the democratic hopes of the masses will be dashed. Remember that it was the military that assumed control of the Egyptian government following Mubarak’s resignation, despite constitutional provisions that his successor should have been the head of the Egyptian parliament. The military is promising elections in September, but that remains months away.

And even if democratic elections are held in countries like Egypt, we still have to be aware of the limits of elections as a proxy for democracy. Real democracy—strong democracy, in Barber’s terms—requires more than elections. As Barber notes, the notion of radical individualism that lies at the heart of liberal political theory produces a limited form of democracy which negates the idea of community central to real (or strong) democracy. For Barber, then, it is the excess of liberalism that undermines democratic structures in the west and facilities cynicism and alienation.

The popular protests taking place across the Middle East in recent weeks is a sign of the strength of civil society in these countries. Despite decades of suppression, civil society in these countries is proving its vitality. Translating the strength of the popular protests into a democratic polis will clearly be a major challenge for the countries of the Middle East in the near future. Clearly there is reason for doubt. But there’s also reason for hope.

The Challenge of a Two-Speed Europe

German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy at the Summit of EU Heads of State.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy at the Summit of EU Heads of State.

The recent spate of crises in the European Union has once again raised questions about the future of the European Union. As Greece and Ireland struggle to rebuild their economies, the debate over the future of the European Union is once again on the stage. At one extreme, Germany and France continue to push for further integration, particularly within the eurozone, the group of seventeen countries using the euro as their unified currency. At the other end, euroskeptics in the European Parliament continue to debate the need for the EU in the first place. Governments in the United Kingdom and many of the former Soviet-bloc countries appear to be hesitant about further economic integration.

This tension, which has long been known as the problem of a two-speed Europe, has become more pronounced in light of recent economic crises and the pressure placed on the euro by the collapse of the Greek and Irish economies. Blogging at the Finanical Times, Philip Stephens points out  that the euro has to date been maintained largely by the sheer will of the German government and its willingness to devote considerable resources (not to mention foreign policy clout) to support the euro and prop up several of the weaker European economies.  Euroskepticism, in other words, has not reached the German Länder. This is not to suggest that German magnanimity is the basis of the euro…Germany clearly benefits as well, as its exports to the rest of the eurozone indicate. But what happens if Germany decides that the euro is no longer a core part of its foreign policy vision?

Or more to the point, is the euro in danger? There is good reason to believe that future crises are in store for the eurozone. The economies of Portugal, Italy, and Spain leave considerable room for concern.

A far more likely scenario, however, would be the continued development of a two speed Europe, with France and Germany leading the charge for a more integrated economic policy within the eurozone, while Britain, the Scandinavian states, and many of the former Soviet-bloc countries, standing on the sidelines of economic integration while moving forward with political union. Certainly some interesting things to consider.

What Makes the World’s Happiest Country Happy?

Once again, Norway was named the World's Happiest Country.

Once again, Norway was named the World's Happiest Country.

Forbes magazine has released its annual ranking of the world’s happiest countries, using data compiled from the Legatum Institute’s annual prosperity index. The prosperity index is an effort to rank countries based on wealth, freedom, security, life satisfaction, and so on. As in years past, Norway topped the list.

While interesting in their own right, these sorts of indices also provide some interesting insights into broader questions of economic and political development.  In most studies, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita [glossary] is the proxy measure of development. The higher the GDP per capita, in other words, the more developed a country is. With its 2010 GDP per capita of approximately $47,000, the United States is relatively more developed than South Korea, with a GDP per capita of approximately $20,000. South Korea, in turn, is considerably more developed than Haiti, which has a GDP per capita of approximately $650. Indeed, the World Bank and other international institutions regularly categorize countries using GDP per capita. Thus, for World Bank lending purposes, maintains four categories of countries: low income countries, with GDPs per capita of less than $996, lower-middle income countries, with GDPs per capita between $996 and $3,945, upper-middle-income countries, with GDPs per capita between $3,946 and $12,195, and high income countries, with GDPs per capita of more than $12,195.

But while we use GDP per capita as a proxy for “development,” the figures often tell us very little about what is actually going on in a specific country. Further, while we generally operationalize development as an increase in GDP per capita, an increase in GDP per capita may or may not actually result in an improvement in the quality of life or life chances in a given country. This is where other figures and indices come in. The Human Development Index, the Gender Empowerment Measure, and Happy Planet Index, even more specific measures like life expectancy, child mortality, or literacy rates can tell us a great deal about what is going on within a specific country.

One interesting comparison is to look at the top ten countries in the various measurements. Let’s take GDP per capita and human development.

According to the IMF, the ten wealthiest countries in the word in 2010 were:

  1. Luxembourg $104,390
  2. Norway $84,543
  3. Qatar $74,422
  4. Switzerland $67,074
  5. Denmark $55,113
  6. Australia $54,869
  7. Sweden $47,667
  8. The United Arab Emirates $47,406
  9. The United States $47,132
  10. The Netherlands $46,418

If we compare this to the top ten countries in the UNDP’s 2010 Human Development Index, which is a composite index which incorporates health, education, and wealth, we see some interesting shifts. The top ten rankings for the HDI are:

  1. Norway
  2. Australia
  3. New Zealand
  4. The United States
  5. Ireland
  6. Liechtenstein
  7. The Netherlands
  8. Canada
  9. Sweden
  10. Germany

Some countries, in other words, overperform relative to the size of their economies, while others tend to underform. Ireland, for example, moves up 7 spaces (from 12th largest economy to 5th best ranking in the HDI), while Germany improves 9 positions (from 19th to 10th). At the other end of the scale, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates experience a sharp drop in their rankings, falling from 3rd and 8th to 38th and 32nd respectively.

And where things get really interesting is when the various measures diverge greatly. When we’re looking at measures which incorporate concrete variables, such as infant mortality rates, literacy rates, or access to education, explanations can be relatively straightforward. One could make a strong case, I think, that the reason that Qatar and the UAE fall so sharply in their standings is because they have not been successful in converting the oil wealth both countries enjoy into social and health benefits for the country’s population as a whole.

But when we get into the fuzzy area of happiness and life satisfaction, things become much murkier. According to the Legatum Institute’s study, the world’s ten happiest countries are:

  1.  Norway
  2. Denmark
  3. Finland
  4. Australia
  5. New Zealand
  6. Sweden
  7. Canada
  8. Switzerland
  9. The Netherlands
  10. The United States

Money, in other words, helps but it doesn’t buy happiness. Wealth is certainly part of the picture—we don’t see very poor countries cracking the top of the charts. But size, trust and social cohesion, and extensive redistribution of wealth, also appear to play a role. Food for thought in development studies.