Tag Archives: arms race

Expanding Japan’s Defense Forces

The Japanese helicopter destroyer JS Hyuga conducts training operations in 2009.

The Japanese helicopter destroyer JS Hyuga conducts training operations.

A study by the Japanese government concluded that the country should bolster its marine forces and introduce surveillance drones in an effort to expand its naval forces to address emerging regional threats. The report, ordered by Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, also proposes improving the country’s defenses against ballistic missile attack and expanding its offensive potential to strike against enemy bases. Because Abe’s party controls both houses of parliament, it is in good position to implement the report’s recommendations after the report is finalized in December.

The report is the latest in a series of moves intended to expand the Japanese military. Earlier this year, Japan announced it would increase military spending by some $2.1 billion, largely to finance the acquisition of new missile interceptors and fighter jets.

The latest report clearly represents a growing concern in the Japanese government about two threats: North Korean ballistic missile technology and the ongoing standoff between Japan and China over the status of the disputed Senkaky/Diaoyu Islands. At the same time, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution limits the ability of Japan to maintain an armed military force, restricting the country to a self-defense capacity only. The Article was included at the insistence of the United States at the end of World War II. Specifically, Article 9 reads,

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. (2) To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

In reality, Japan maintains a small military force known as the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). But the composition of those forces remains a politically sensitive subject both inside and outside Japan, with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the opposition Democratic Party of Japan both asserting that Article 9 permits the maintenance of a military force for self-defense and advocating revision of Article 9 to make that point clearer. Leftist parties, though, argue that the JSDF is unconstitutional and propose dramatic reforms, such as transforming the standing military forces into something more akin to a national militia.

The question of increased military spending raises the specter of an arms race in the region. The challenge—as the security dilemma model suggests—is that increased military spending by one country is often met by increased military spending by others. As a result, the efforts of one country—in this case, Japan—to improve its security position by increasing military spending and capacity may actually be undermined as other countries—in this case, China and North Korea—respond in a similar manner. Security is actually decreased rather than improved as a result.

What do you think? Should Japan expand its military capacity in response to growing tensions in the region? Or does Japanese military growth merely exacerbate existing tensions? Take the poll or leave a comment below and let us know what you think.

Advertisements

State Failure, the Security Dilemma, and Libya’s Guns

Libya's interim Prime Minister Abdul Raheem al-Keeb has his hands full trying to establish a functioning government and disarm militias in the country.

An article in today’s New York Times describes a Libyan father’s accidental death at the hands of his son and raises an alarm about the vast arsenal of easily accessible weaponry in post-Qaddafi Libya.  On the night that Qaddafi’s “loathed and feared” son Muatassim was captured by Libyan rebels, the city of Misurata erupted in celebratory gunfire.  Rebel commander Hassan Nahassi, who had just returned home from the battlefront in Sirte in order to spend time with his family, acquiesced to his young boys’ request to fire a rifle in celebration.  His 12-year-old son Ali lost control of the automatic weapon and accidentally shot and killed his father.  Yet the surviving relatives and friends of Mr. Nahassi are not about to give up their weapons:

“Guns, many Libyans say, set them free. And with the future uncertain and memories of persecution fresh, almost no one is yet sure how to give the guns up, even as they acknowledge that much of their former ruler’s arsenal would be better not loose.”

Abdullah Kamal bin Hameda, a 22-year-old nephew of the deceased and now a caretaker in his uncle’s home, is quoted as saying the adults must keep the weapons out of children’s reach, but otherwise must keep them: “It is difficult to put down the guns right now, because I do not know who is my enemy and who is my friend,” Mr. Hameda said. “When we will have a new government, and it is strong and we trust it, then we will give them the guns. But not now, not to the N.T.C. [Transitional National Council, the interim Libyan government].”

Political scientists have pointed out that when governments are unable to provide security (a primary symptom of state failure) people commonly take up arms to defend themselves and their kin.  This frequently leads to the formation of militias along ethnic or sectarian lines, and can spark a security dilemma, whereby one group’s efforts to ensure its security (usually through an arms buildup) reduces the security of other groups, heightens tensions, and ultimately makes the original group less secure.  The security dilemma is more common in international politics, where there is no world government to ensure states’ security (a condition realist scholars call anarchy).  But when states fail, anarchy is produced within states.

Mr. Hameda’s experience is a chilling reminder of how state failure and its attendant security dilemmas can produce tensions and arms races despite people’s best intentions.  He told the New York Times that he “was eager to return to civilian life, and leave war behind.”  However, “he also said he intended to maintain a small armory at his home, where he has five automatic rifles claimed from the defeated Qaddafi forces, until he sees what comes next.  ‘My house is like an army base,’ he said.”

The South China Sea Arms Race

The Financial Times last week carried a story discussing the increasing level of arms purchases by several Southeast Asian states. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Singapore recently placed an order for two new submarines and twelve fighter jets to supplement previous deliveries which included six frigates and 32 fighter aircraft. All told, between 2005 and 2009, Singapore’s spending on arms imports increased 146 percent. Not to be outdone, Indonesia increased its spending by 84 percent, and Malaysia increased its spending by 722 percent (and no, that’s not a typo).Vietnam and Thailand have also announced intensions to increase military spending.

Though many have not publically stated the reason for the increases, most observers point to growing tensions over disputed territories in the South China Sea and dramatic increases in Chinese military spending as the primary causes.

The current South China Sea arms race provides a classic example of the security dilemma [glossary], in international relations. From the perspective of each individual actor, the rational course of action is to increase defense spending in order to facilitate greater security. However, the increase in the armament level of one state leads neighboring states to feel less secure. They therefore increase their own defense spending, leading to a regional arms race. The end result is that, while pursuing rational actions intended to increase their own security individually, all states wind up feeling less secure than they would have felt absent the increase in total military spending.